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Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers
Within the Federal Judicial System*
Richard L. Marcusf
The weight of the Supreme Court's recent caseload has led even Jus-
tices to assert publicly that the Court cannot resolve all conflicts among
the appellate courts' interpretations of federal law., Yet the courts of ap-
peals, also buried under an avalanche of appeals, ever more frequently
reach conflicting results. Together, these developments have spawned vari-
ous proposals for resolving intercircuit conflicts-most recently the crea-
tion of a temporary Intercircuit Tribunal of the United States Courts of
Appeals,' which proponents argue will avert a breakdown in the uniform-
ity of national law. Meanwhile, plaintiffs continue to file lawsuits assert-
ing federal claims and the federal courts continue to decide them, often
inconsistently. Not surprisingly, the existence of conflicts among the cir-
cuits gives plaintiffs a significant incentive for forum shopping.
Cases do not always remain in the forum initially selected by the plain-
tiff; in the federal system transfers to another court occur with increasing
frequency. Since 1948, a defendant has been able to combat the inconven-
ience caused by plaintiff's forum shopping in the federal system by mov-
ing to transfer the action to a more convenient district under section
1404(a) of the Judicial Code.3 In addition, under the multidistrict litiga-
tion transfer statute passed in 1968,' cases having common issues of fact
may be transferred to a single district for coordinated pretrial proceedings,
with later transfer for trial under section 1404(a) often a possibility. Be-
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1. E.g., Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 445-46 (1983)
(asserting that "dear majority" of Justices feel that "something must be done" about caseload burdens
of Court); Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 408 (1975) (letter from Justice Rehnquist,
noting that "[c]onflicting views on questions of federal law remain unresolved") [hereinafter cited as
Hruska Commission]; White, A Salute to the Circuits, 28 Loy. L. REV. 669, 670 (1982) ("[Tihe
courts of appeals these days are in large part-and necessarily so-finally responsible for the inter-
pretation and enforcement, and hence for the condition, of the federal law."). For a discussion of the
appellate crunch and the development of conflicts between the circuits, see infra Part III.
2. For a description of the bills now pending before Congress, see infra note 82.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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cause of the increasing availability of transfer and because of the growing
number of cases, over two thousand cases are now transferred each year.5
The interaction between these two trends-toward more frequent con-
flicts and more numerous transfers-raises a choice-of-law question:
When a federal claim is transferred, should the transferee court apply the
interpretation of the circuit in which the case was filed or of the circuit to
which it was transferred? Until 1964, the lower federal courts that had
confronted this problem agreed that the transferee court could apply its
own interpretation. 6 Several of these courts noted that despite the diver-
gent interpretations of federal law, it is a single body of rules applicable
in all federal courts and parties are not entitled to select a preferred inter-
pretation. In 1964, however, the Supreme Court held in Van Dusen v.
Barrack' that the law of the state in which the transferor court sat8 would
continue to apply after a section 1404(a) transfer of a diversity case to a
district court sitting in another state. Since then, lower courts have gener-
ally concluded that Van Dusen also requires application of the transferor
circuit's interpretation of federal law to transferred federal claims.9 De-
spite some murmuring of dissent,10 however, neither courts nor commen-
tators have analyzed the application of Van Dusen to transferred federal
claims. That is the purpose of this Article.
The Article begins by briefly describing the operation of the federal
transfer statutes. It then reviews Van Dusen's resolution of the choice-of-
law problem in diversity cases and finds that the decision was based on
two grounds: the principles of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Co.,11 and the
presumed legislative intent behind section 1404(a) to preserve the plain-
tiff's "venue privilege" to shop for favorable state law. Turning to ques-
tions of federal law, the Article finds that neither the existence of conflicts
among the circuits nor the perception that circuits treat certain issues dif-
5. See infra note 16; p. 681.
6. See infra p. 692.
7. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
8. This does not mean that the transferor state's substantive law will necessarily govern the case
following transfer. The transferee court must apply the substantive law that the transferor court
would have applied following a choice-of-law determination. Because Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), requires a district court to apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in
which it sits in a diversity case, see infra p. 682, the transferor state's choice-of-law rules identify the
state whose substantive law will govern the case following transfer.
9. See infra p. 693.
10. Judge Henry Friendly has asserted that "I take [Van Dusen] to be limited to choices of state
law." Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 412 (1972)
(emphasis in original); see also In re Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R. Sec. & Antitrust Litig., 543 F.2d 1058
(3d Cir. 1976). There the court noted that others had applied Van Dusen to transfers of federal
claims and observed, "It is difficult to understand why this should be so since Van Dusen i. Barrack
involved conflicting state wrongful death policies, while in theory, at least, federal law, in its area of
competence, is assumed to be nationally uniform, whether or not it is in fact." Id. at 1065 n.19
(emphasis in original).
11. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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ferently is likely to be eliminated in the near future. Accordingly, the
choice-of-law problem in transferred federal claims cases will endure.
Against this background, the Article analyzes the proper handling of
the choice-of-law question for transferred federal claims. It finds first that
neither of Van Dusen's principles provides a sufficient reason to prefer
the transferor circuit's interpretation in such cases. Erie is simply irrele-
vant where federal claims are involved, and its policies have no bearing on
the choice between interpretations of federal law. The venue privilege is
similarly inapposite once plaintiff's choice of forum has been vetoed by a
transfer. The Van Dusen Court stressed the venue privilege because there
is no federal principle by which to select the state law that should govern
diversity cases. Where federal claims are transferred, however, the princi-
ple that the transferee federal court is competent to decide federal issues
correctly indicates that the transferee's interpretation should apply. If Van
Dusen compels the transferee court to decide the case in a way it views as
wrong, then that court's competence is undermined. Moreover, application
of the Van Dusen rule reduces the effectiveness of the transfer statutes by
creating obstacles to the efficient handling of transferred federal claim
cases. Van Dusen therefore should not govern such cases.
I. TRANSFER IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Until 1948, transfer of cases among federal courts was impossible. Dis-
missal on grounds of forum non conveniens was the only remedy for abuse
of venue provisions. In 1947 the Supreme Court confirmed the availability
of such dismissal as a matter of federal common law where trial in the
forum chosen by plaintiff would unreasonably burden defendant or the
court."' Because it relies on dismissal, however, forum non conveniens is
tailored for situations in which the more convenient forum is in a different
judicial system.
In 1948, Congress provided section 1404(a) as an alternative to dismis-
sal for cases where the more convenient forum is another federal court.
Section 1404(a) authorizes the federal judge before whom a civil action is
pending to transfer it "[flor the convenience of the parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice," albeit only to a district where venue and juris-
diction are proper.13 On motions made under section 1404(a), the plain-
12. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 511-12 (1947). For a discussion of the common law
doctrine of forum non conveniens, see Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-
American Law, 29 COLUM. L. Rav. 1 (1929).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976). In Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), the Supreme Court
construed the statute to forbid transfer to a district where venue would not have been proper even
though defendants moved to transfer and therefore were clearly willing to waive any objections to
venue.
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tiff's choice of venue is generally accorded substantial weight and the
moving party must make a showing of inconvenience sufficient to over-
come it.14 But that showing need not be sufficient to justify dismissal.1"
After transfer, the transferee district court has full responsibility for dis-
position of the case, and appeal from its judgment is to the transferee
circuit's court of appeals. Recently, about 2,000 cases per year have been
transferred under section 1404(a).-
In 1968, Congress added a major transfer provision, the Multidistrict
Litigation Act. 17 This statute, based on the experiences of the federal
courts with voluntary pretrial coordination of thousands of electrical
equipment price-fixing antitrust cases,"8 authorized transfer of cases hav-
ing a common question of fact to a single district for coordinated or con-
solidated pretrial procedures. Transfers under the newer statute are made
not by a single judge, as is true under section 1404(a), but rather by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.19 The statute provides that
transfers should depend on the convenience of the witnesses and parties
and on judicial efficiency. But as a practical matter the Panel gives consid-
erations of judicial economy primary importance; the interests of the par-
ties thus receive correspondingly less emphasis.20 Cases may be trans-
14. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3848
(1976) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE].
15. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 30-32 (1955).
16. There are no published figures regarding transfers pursuant to § 1404(a). However, the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts has maintained records on the number of such trans-
fers since fiscal year 1975. They are as follows:
Fiscal year ending 6/30/75 - 1,836 cases transferred.
Fiscal year ending 6/30/76 - 2,016 cases transferred.
Fiscal year ending 6/30/77 - 1,712 cases transferred.
Fiscal year ending 6/30/78 - 1,909 cases transferred.
Fiscal year ending 6/30/79 - 1,763 cases transferred.
Fiscal year ending 6/30/80 - 2,120 cases transferred.
Fiscal year ending 6/30/81 - 2,435 cases transferred.
Fiscal year ending 6/30/82 - 2,445 cases transferred.
Letter from Richard L. Marcus to James A. McCafferty, Chief of Statistical Analysis & Reports
Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (July 1, 1983) (on file with author); letter
from James A. McCafferty to Richard L. Marcus (July 7, 1983) (on file with author).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
18. Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1001, 1001 & n.1 (1974).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1976).
20. Specific cases cannot easily be cited to prove this point, but it is evident from a review of the
Panel's decisions in toto and is confirmed by commentators. See, e.g., Herndon, Section 1407 and
Antitrust Multidistrict Litigation-The First Decade, 47 ANTrrRusT L.J. 1161, 1169 (1979) ("The
Panel's decisions have virtually eliminated the requirement that transfer 'will be for the convenience
of parties and witnesses' as a significant factor affecting the transfer of antitrust actions."); Herndon
& Higginbotham, Complex Multidistrict Litigation-An Overview of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407, 31 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 33, 43-45 (1979) ("Doubt is generally resolved in favor of transfer . . . ."); Levy,
Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 49 (1971) (judi-
cial efficiency "plays the greatest role"); Note, supra note 18, at 1003 ("Once a threshold level of
potential savings [in judicial time] is found, however, transfer is almost inevitable.").
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ferred to any district, whether or not jurisdiction or venue would
originally have been proper there.21 Once the Panel has designated a
given set of facts for multidistrict treatment, any cases filed later that in-
volve the same fact issues are automatically transferred as "tag-along"
cases to the court designated by the Multidistrict Panel unless a party files
, a motion to vacate the transfer order.2 2 During the first fourteen years of
its operation, the Panel transferred an average of more than 500 cases
annually;23 for the last five years it has transferred an average of 860
cases per year.24
Although the multidistrict transfer statute authorizes transfer only for
pretrial purposes, and specifically provides that the cases shall be re-
manded to the transferor district for trial,2 5 only a few cases are ever re-
manded.2' The transferee judge has complete authority to make pretrial
rulings, including an order to transfer the trial to his own district under
section 1404(a). 27 Not surprisingly, transferee judges immersed in com-
plex cases often feel that a transfer under section 1404(a) would promote
justice because a remand would waste their hard-earned understanding of
the issues and would impose an unnecessary burden on the judge to whom
the case is remanded. Even without a transfer under section 1404(a),
transferee judges can often dispose of part or all of a case on summary
judgment;28 one commentator has observed that "transferee courts have
usually attempted to decide all substantive issues in the litigation."2'
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).
22. J.P.M.D.L.R. 9, 10. The Rules of the Panel are printed at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981). J.P.M.D.L.R. 1 defines a tag-along action as "a civil action involving common questions of
fact with actions previously transferred." Such an action can be transferred even before all defendants
are served. J.P.M.D.L.R. 10(c). Once transfer is accomplished, a party who desires a remand, absent
the recommendation of the transferee judge, bears an "especially heavy burden." Weigel, TheJudicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 584
(1978).
23. See W. FOLEY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNrrED STATES CoURTS 130 (1982) (reporting that between July 1968 and June 1982 the
Panel had transferred 7,380 cases pursuant to § 1407).
24. These figures are from the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts for the years 1978 to 1982.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).
26. See Weigel, supra note 22, at 583 (noting that less than five percent of actions transferred by
Panel were in fact remanded).
27. J.P.M.D.L.R. 11(b); see Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Bristol
Bay Salmon Fishery Antitrust Litig., 424 F. Supp. 504, 507 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976).
28. E.g., Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 668 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956
(1974); Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, 463 F.2d 1017, 1018 n.2 (6th Cir. 1972).
29. Note, The Experience of Transferee Courts Under the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 39 U. CI.
L. REv. 588, 607-08 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Experience of Transferee Courts]. Arguably
such dispositions on the merits by transferee judges go beyond Congress' intent, see id. at 595-96, but
there has been no effort to prevent them. On the contrary, there have been suggestions that Congress
should authorize transfer for trial. The Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association has pro-
posed to extend multidistrict transfer to include transfer for trial, but only after transfer to a proper
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Moreover, if the case is later remanded to the transferor court, that court
is arguably bound by such rulings."0 If final judgment is entered by the
transferee judge, however, appeal is to the court of appeals of the trans-
feree circuit. Thus, the transferee court usually decides the merits of the
case under either section 1404(a) or the Multidistrict Litigation Act.
II. TRANSFER AND CHOICE OF LAW IN DIVERSITY CASES
Under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 1 federal
courts must apply the choice-of-law rules of the states in which they sit to
issues of state law arising in diversity cases. Despite Klaxon, a federal
court could indirectly affect the choice of law by dismissing on grounds of
forum non conveniens, since dismissal would compel the plaintiff to refile
in another state, whose choice-of-law rules would subsequently apply.
Dismissal is the only situation, however, in which a federal court has an
independent role to play in deciding which state's law will apply to a
claim based on state law.
Transfer within the fedeial system greatly complicates the application
of Klaxon. Almost from the beginning, section 1404(a) created a new spe-
cies of choice-of-law problem in diversity cases: Should the transferee
court apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits or the state
in which the transferor court sits? In 1950, the Tenth Circuit opted for
the law of the transferor state in Headrick v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railway.32 Plaintiff there, a Missouri resident, alleged that he had
been injured in California while riding on a bus operated by defendant, a
Kansas corporation. The statute of limitations had run in Missouri, Cali-
fornia, and Kansas, so plaintiff sued in state court in New Mexico, which
had a longer limitations period.33 Defendant removed to federal court and
moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds or, in the alternative,
to transfer to California under section 1404(a). The district court granted
the motion to dismiss, reasoning that transfer would be pointless because
venue. See ABA, SUMMARY OF AcTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 26-27 (1976); see also Note,
Air Crash Litigation and 28 U.S.C. Section 1407: Experience Suggests A Solution, 1981 U. ILL. L.
REv. 927 (favoring transfer for trial in airplane crash cases).
30. See Weigel, supra note 22, at 577 ("[I]t would be improper to permit a transferor judge to
overturn orders of a transferee judge even though error in the latter might result in reversal of the
final judgment of the transferor court."). Judge Weigel did not directly address the situation in which
the transferor court disagrees with the ruling of the transferee court due to a conflict between the
transferor and transferee circuits.
31. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The wisdom of Klaxon has been questioned, but that dispute is beyond
the scope of this Article. For a review of such issues, see R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLIar OF LAWS §§ 10.5, 10.8 (2d ed. 1980).
32. 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950).
33. Plaintiff admitted that he selected New Mexico because its limitations period had not run. See
id. at 311.
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California law would apply after a transfer, and the case would then sim-
ply be dismissed as time-barred.
The Tenth Circuit reversed. It held that the passage of section 1404(a)
limited the district court's power to dismiss on grounds of forum non con-
veniens to situations in which transfer to the more convenient forum was
impossible." Since transfer to California was clearly possible, dismissal
was forbidden. The court concluded further that transfer would not affect
the law applied to the case. It explained that plaintiff had a "legal right to
select any forum where the defendant was amenable to process" and that
"[ulpon removal . ..the case would remain a New Mexico case con-
trolled by the law and policy of that state . . . ."5 Because Erie prevents
the federal court from "tak[ing] away that which a state has given," 6 the
Tenth Circuit held that "no rights acquired in the forum selected by
plaintiff would be lost on transfer.
'3 7
Spurred in large part by Headrick, Professor Brainerd Currie pub-
lished a long article in 1955 examining the impact of the transfer provi-
sion on choice-of-law issues.3 8 He began by arguing that every available
option for handling the problem had defects.3 9 Emphasizing the role that
forum non conveniens had played in the evolution of section 1404(a), he
34. Id. at 308. This conclusion appears to be correct. See, e.g., Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S.
29, 32 (1955) (dismissal "eliminated" by passage of § 1404(a)); 1 J. MOORE, J. LucAs, H. FINK, D.
WECKSTEIN & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PtAcmrcE 1 0.145 [6.-I], at 1636 (2d ed. 1983)
("Where another federal district court is the more convenient forum, the power to dismiss . . . no
longer exists. . . .") [hereinafter cited as MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAerIcE]. As a consequence, even the
limited power to affect choice of law by dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds, see supra p.
682, no longer exists.
35. 182 F.2d at 309. Under Klaxon, the reference to "law" of New Mexico refers to the choice-
of-law rules of that state. In Headrick, the court of appeals did not address possible due process
arguments against application of other rules of New Mexico law (i.e., statute of limitations) to the
case. See infra note 149. Nevertheless, it apparently assumed that New Mexico choice-of-law rules
would require application of New Mexico's longer limitations period.
36. 182 F.2d at 309.
37. Id. at 310. It should be apparent that the Headrick court's acquired rights idea is different
from the "vested rights" approach of Joseph Beale, the reporter of the First Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws. Beale argued that, without reference to initiation of litigation, rights were vested by
conduct. See E. SOOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.5 (1982). The Headrick court reasoned
that the rights involved were acquired under New Mexico law because the lawsuit was filed there.
38. Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 405 (1955). The
article is 99 pages long. It discusses Headrick, described as the leading case, at 408-15, 444-45,
470-82.
39. Currie posited three possibilities: (1) applying the law of the transferee state; (2) applying the
law of the transferor state; and (3) applying the law of the transferor state unless that state would
dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. He found the first obnoxious to Erie because the sub-
stantive law would change if the accident of diversity allowed the case into federal court. He ques-
tioned the second because cases filed in federal court would be governed by the choice-of-law rules of
a state that would have dismissed the action on forum non conveniens grounds. He found the third
inadequate because of the difficulty of deciding whether the state court would dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds; if so, whether it would condition that dismissal on some agreement regarding the
applicable law; and whether, in the event of such dismissal, the plaintiff would refile in the state to
which transfer is ordered under § 1404(a). See Currie, supra note 38, at 438-53.
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saw no reason to interpret the statute to protect the wanton forum shop-
ping exhibited in Headrick.'° He proposed instead that the federal courts
develop "enlightened principles of conflicts of law" to decide what law
should apply following transfer.41 Five years later, however, he published
a retraction,42 in which he explained that his earlier proposal was "funda-
mentally and impossibly wrong' 43 because no choice-of-law system could
be developed in the abstract without an examination of the interests of the
various states involved. As a consequence, Currie concluded that the prob-
lem of choice of law after transfer was "insoluble . . . while diversity
jurisdiction exists"'4  because "no choice-of-law rule can possibly be in-
vented that will do anything more than subordinate the policy of one state
to that of the other.'
4 5
Despite Currie's pessimism, in 1964 the Supreme Court decided how
federal courts should handle the choice-of-law problem in transfer of di-
versity cases. In Van Dusen v. Barrack,'8 the Supreme Court adopted
much of Headrick's reasoning to hold that the law of the transferor court
should govern in such transfers. The suits in Van Dusen were brought by
personal representatives of Pennsylvania residents killed when an airliner
bound for Philadelphia crashed in Boston Harbor shortly after takeoff.
Pursuant to section 1404(a), the district court ordered the forty actions
filed in Pennsylvania transferred to Massachusetts, where over one hun-
dred other actions were already pending.' 7 Plaintiffs opposed the transfer
on the ground that they would be harmed by the differences between the
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts measures of damages in wrongful death
cases. 48 Like most states, Pennsylvania allowed recovery to compensate for
40. Currie's theory was that § 1404(a) evolved from forum non conveniens even though it was
different in significant respects from the common law doctrine. Accordingly, he felt that the elimina-
tion of the power to dismiss (with its concomitant power to affect which choice-of-law rules apply)
implied some authority for the federal court directly to affect choice of law. See Currie, supra note 38,
at 466-67.
41. As posited by Currie, this system would begin with the premise that transferor law should
apply, and would require the party desiring a change in law to justify it. As part of the transfer
process the transferor court could, however, decide that some other law "ought" to apply. In making
this determination, the court should not, he reasoned, select the law of the transferee state simply
because it is the transferee. Instead, pursuant to a "federal law of conflict of laws," it should, as part
of the transfer order, direct that the specified law apply after transfer. That order would thenceforth
become the law of the case. See Currie, supra note 38, at 460-64. For a more recent argument
favoring the development of federal principles of choice of law, see Abrams, Pouer, Convenience and
the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 49-57 (1982).
42. Currie, Change of Venue and the Coifiict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 341
(1960).
43. Id. at 341.
44. Id. at 348.
45. Id. at 346.
46. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
47. Id. at 614.
48. Plaintiffs also argued that, because they were not qualified in Massachusetts to act as repre-
sentatives of the estates of the deceased, defendants could claim after transfer that plaintiffs lacked
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loss, but Massachusetts measured damages based on the culpability of the
defendant's conduct and limited the award to $20,000.' Assuming the
Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules would call for application of the Penn-
sylvania measure of damages, but that after transfer Massachusetts
choice-of-law rules would apply pursuant to Klaxon and would require
reference to the Massachusetts damage measure, plaintiffs claimed that
this adverse change in law should preclude transfer.
The Supreme Court, however, held that transfer was not precluded by
differences between Pennsylvania law and Massachusetts law because "[a]
change of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state
law, but a change of courtrooms." 50 Accordingly, Pennsylvania choice-of-
law rules would still determine the proper measure of damages. The
Court reserved the question whether the same principles would preserve
transferor law if the plaintiff requested the transfer or if the state in
which the case was originally filed would itself have dismissed the case on
forum non conveniens grounds."1 With respect to defendants' motions to
transfer diversity cases, however, the choice-of-law issue was settled.
The Van Dusen Court defined the issue primarily as one of statutory
construction, but it relied heavily upon Headrick to support its analysis.5"
First, the Court characterized section 1404(a) as a "judicial housekeeping
measure" designed only to ameliorate the geographical inconvenience of
trial in a distant forum.53 Given this limited purpose, the Court found
that the statute "was not designed to narrow the plaintiff's venue privilege
or to defeat the state-law advantages that might accrue from the exercise
of this venue privilege."54 Otherwise, it noted, defendants could turn the
transfer statute itself into a device for forum shopping.
Second, the Court reasoned that its statutory interpretation was sup-
ported by the Erie policy of uniformity of law within a state, a policy
which also led to Klaxon's requirement that federal courts apply the
capacity to sue. Id. at 615. Rule 17(b) provides that capacity of an individual acting in a representa-
tive capacity to sue "shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court is held,"
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b), which would be Massachusetts after transfer. Plaintiff's principal Rule 17(b)
argument was that Massachusetts was not a district in which the action "might have been brought"
within the meaning of § 1404(a) as interpreted in Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). In Van
Dusen, the Court rejected this argument, thus narrowing Hoffman to federal venue and jurisdictional
requirements. 376 U.S. at 621-24. With respect to capacity, the Court held that Rule 17(b) would be
interpreted to require application of the law of the transferor state. 376 U.S. at 641-43.
49. See 376 U.S. at 627 (acknowledging that laws of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania are "signif-
icantly different").
50. Id. at 639 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 640.
52. See id. at 631-32.
53. Id. at 636-37. This construction undercuts Professor Currie's assumption that § 1404(a) and
forum non conveniens are closely related. See supra note 40.
54. 376 U.S. at 635.
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choice-of-law rules of the states in which they sit. 5 For purposes of this
policy, the Court explained, "the critical identity to be maintained is be-
tween the federal district court which decides the case and the courts of
the State in which the action was filed."5' Therefore, the accident of di-
versity in the Pennsylvania cases should not result in the application of
another state's law.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICTS AMONG THE CIRCUITS
In an ideal system, Van Dusen problems would not arise in transfers of
cases involving federal claims because all courts would interpret federal
law uniformly. But the system is not ideal; historical development and
current necessity make conflicts among the circuits inevitable. Before
1891, appellate review in the federal system was basically limited to re-
view by the Supreme Court.5" In this system there were few opportunities
for conflicting interpretations of federal law,58 but the burden eventually
placed on the Supreme Court's caseload necessitated changes. In 1891,
after decades of debate, Congress passed the Evarts Act,5' which provided
an intermediate level of appellate review by creating courts of appeals for
each circuit.
Congress may never have intended that the concept of law of the circuit
develop,"' but something of the sort was inevitable because the Evarts Act
directed each court of appeals to interpret federal law independently. Ac-
cordingly, although courts of appeals pursue internal uniformity,61 no
55. Id. at 637-40.
56. Id. at 639 (footnote omitted).
57. Technically, the circuit courts had jurisdiction to review decisions of the district courts in
certain matters, but there was no trace of a system of intermediate appellate review between the trial
courts (which included the circuit courts) and the Supreme Court. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LAN-
DIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 12-13 (1927). Indeed, the original circuit courts were
the weak spot of the system and were repeatedly criticized until they were abolished in 1911. Act of
March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087; see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 36-41 (2d ed. 1973).
58. While conflicting interpretations were not a great concern, the absence of effective appellate
supervision created arbitrary and disparate results. The ineffectiveness of review by the circuit courts,
on which the district judges themselves sat, often made it appear that district judges had untrammelled
power to decide as they pleased. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 57, at 87-88. As one
contemporary observer described review of their own decisions by district judges: "Such an appeal is
not from Philip drunk to Philip sober, but from Philip sober to Philip intoxicated with the vanity of a
matured opinion and doubtless also a published decision." Hill, The Federal Judicial System, in ABA,
REPORT OF THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 289, 307
(1889).
59. The Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
60. See Schaefer, Reducing Circuit Conflicts, 69 A.B.A. J. 452, 453-54 (1983). When the Evarts
Act was debated in Congress, one concern was the risk of fragmenting national law. See 21 CONG.
REc. 3407-08 (1890) (remarks of Rep. Breckinridge); id. at 10,221 (remarks of Sen. Evarts).
61. See Wasby, Inconsistency in the United States Courts of Appeals: Dimensions and Mecha-
nisms for Resolution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1979). For an example of such intracircuit discipline,
see Ransom v. S &S Food Center, 700 F.2d 670, 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (refusing to consider appel-
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court of appeals is bound to respect the decision of another on an issue of
federal law.62 Indeed, when the Fifth Circuit was recently subdivided into
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit had to act affirma-
tively to adopt Fifth Circuit precedent, which otherwise would not have
been binding. 3 This independence does not make consistency between cir-
cuits irrelevant. Courts of appeals often endorse such uniformity as a mat-
ter of policy and strive to avoid conflicts."' But real defer-
ence-unexamined adherence to the decisions of another circuit-is no
substitute for the independent decisionmaking by each court of appeals
that is inherent in the system created by the Evarts Act.
6 5
The Evarts Act provided for resolution of intercircuit conflicts through
Supreme Court review on writ of certiorari. The leading commentators on
the Supreme Court's practice assert that uniformity of decision among the
courts of appeals was a primary purpose of the certiorari jurisdiction.66
Although others disagree,67 the Supreme Court has identified the exis-
lant's argument, "even though we should be convinced of its correctness," because issue had already
been resolved against appellant's position by circuit).
62. Newsweek v. United States Postal Serv., 663 F.2d 1186, 1196 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd sub noain.
National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 2717 (1983);
Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1980); 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 34, S 0.402[1], at 14-15 (circuits do not consider themselves bound by one another's
decisions). For further discussion, see infra pp. 703-07.
63. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981).
64. The best known expression of such sentiment is by Chief Judge Lay of the Eighth Circuit in
Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980):
As an appellate court, we strive to maintain uniformity in the law among the circuits, wher-
ever reasoned analysis will allow, thus avoiding unnecessary burdens on the Supreme Court
docket. Unless our 11 courts of appeals are thus willing to promote a cohesive network of
national law, needless division and confusion will encourage further splintering and the forma-
tion of otherwise unnecessary additional tiers in the framework of our national court system.
Id. at 541. Although the burden of reading cases to keep up with developments reportedly occupies
him 18 hours a day, Is Justice Short-Circuited?, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 25, 1983, at 1, col. 1, Judge Lay has
gone on record as opposing current proposals for a new court to resolve intercircuit differences. Lay,
Query: Will the Proposed National Court of Appeals Create More Problems Than It Solves?, 66
JUDICATURE 437 (1983).
65. Nonetheless, requiring precisely such deference is advocated in Note, Securing Uniformity in
National Lam: A Proposal for National Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 87 YALE L.J. 1219
(1978). The author urges federal adoption of an approach based on the California court system, in
which, the Note asserts, decisions by the intermediate appellate courts bind the entire state until the
state supreme court holds to the contrary. See id. at 1232 & n.83. In fact, however, the California
system is also beset with conflicts. See Friedman & Marer, The Appellate Divisions Are Out of Con-
trol, 3 CAL. LAW., Apr. 1983, at 13.
66. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.4 (5th ed. 1978).
67. Judge J. Clifford Wallace of the Ninth Circuit has recently argued that Congress' decision to
give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review only state court decisions that upheld state statutes
against federal challenges suggests that it was more concerned with supremacy than uniformity. Wal-
lace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Mole-
hill?, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 913, 917-18 (1983). But this difference in treatment could also be explained
on the ground that uniformity concerns are less important when the state statute is held invalid on
federal grounds. Cf J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33-34 (2d ed.
1983) (explaining fact that presently Supreme Court review of state court decisions invalidating state
statutes on federal grounds is discretionary, while review is obligatory if state court upholds state
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tence of a conflict among the circuits as an important consideration in
deciding whether to grant certiorari. 68
When conflicts developed among the circuits on important issues, the
Supreme Court often resolved them. Two well-known recent examples
should suffice. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,69 the Court resolved a con-
flict between circuits by holding that indirect purchasers lack standing to
assert an antitrust claim for price fixing.70 In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder7 the Court held that proof of scienter is required to establish
a claim for securities fraud under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act 72 thereby rejecting the various formulations utilized by several
courts of appeals that permitted recovery on a showing of negligence
alone.7 Many more examples could be added.
The Supreme Court's eventual resolution of many intercircuit conflicts
does not make these conflicts unimportant. Ordinarily there is a substan-
tial delay between the first decision on a legal issue over which a conflict
develops and an eventual resolution by the Supreme Court.74 During the
interregnum, the lower courts must decide the cases before them, and un-
doubtedly plaintiffs in some circuits fare better than those in others pre-
cisely because of the differing approaches of the circuits. This disparity, in
turn, may impose significant changes in interpretation upon transferred
cases.75 Thus, even when the system works with reasonable dispatch,
there is the potential for disparate results. Moreover, the Supreme Court
is vulnerable to fragmentation akin to that in lower courts; the Court's
actual resolution of issues often leaves room for continuing differences
among the circuits.
7 6
statute against federal challenge, partly on ground that in former situation there is no threat to uni-
formity of federal law).
68. See Sup. CT. R. 19.1(b) (specifying conflict between circuits as ground for grant of certiorari).
69. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
70. See id. at 728 & n.8 (noting split in circuits).
71. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
73. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (discussing varying approaches of courts of appeals).
74. Illinois Brick provides an illustration. As the Supreme Court noted there in describing the
conflict among the courts of appeals, 431 U.S. at 731 n.8, the first such decision by a court of appeals
was in 1971, based on a district court decision in 1970. The conflict developed in 1973, when another
court of appeals reached an opposite result. The Supreme Court resolved the conflict in 1977, four
years after it developed and seven years after the first reported district court decision on the issue.
75. For an illustration resulting from the split in the circuits regarding standing of indirect pur-
chasers to sue for price fixing, which the Court resolved in Illinois Brick, see infra p. 718.
76. For an examination of the Supreme Court's recent penchant for plurality and concurring
opinions, see Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974
DUKE L.J. 59; Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 756 (1980). Some observers suggest that the increase in such plurality opinions contradicts as-
sertions that Supreme Court Justices are overburdened. See Hellman, Caseload, Conflicts, and Deci-
sional Capacityl'Does the Supreme Court Need Help?, 67 JUDIC ATURE 28, 32-33 (1983) (prolifera-
tion of separate opinions and disposition of unimportant cases suggest Court not overburdened).
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The Supreme Court's heavy caseload has made matters increasingly
difficult. Commentators now regularly assert that the Court can no longer
decide enough cases to resolve the existing conflicts among the circuits.'
Meanwhile, the exploding dockets of the courts of appeals and the attend-
ant increases in the number of circuit judges have increased the likelihood
of future conflicts not only between circuits but even within circuits.
There is real concern that the number of intracircuit conflicts will rise
geometrically as the number of judges on the larger courts mounts.", The
pressures to split circuits, which led to the subdivision of the Fifth Circuit,
have therefore also increased. Indeed, a respected circuit judge recently
predicted that there may eventually be a federal circuit for every state."'
While such fragmentation of circuits may reduce the frequency of in-
tracircuit conflicts, it obviously multiplies the potential of intercircuit
conflicts.8 0
Over the last fifteen years, the prospect of increased conflicts has stimu-
lated a number of proposals to create a new National Court of Appeals to
resolve such conflicts."1 In 1983, bills were introduced in both the Senate
and the House to create a temporary Intercircuit Tribunal of the United
States Courts of Appeals to perform that function.82 But the sense of Ar-
77. White, supra note 1, at 670; see Carrington, Crowded Dockets and The Courts of Appeals:
The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Lau, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 580 (1969)
("The 'law of the circuit' has emerged as a response to the Supreme Court's incapacity to resolve
intracircuit conflicts."). Efforts to verify these assertions have proved somewhat ambiguous. See
Hellman, The Supreme Court, the National Lau, and the Selection of Cases for the Plenary Docket,
44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 521 (1983).
78. For a discussion of the methods used by the Ninth Circuit, the largest circuit, to reduce in-
tracircuit conflicts, see Lateef, Keeping Up With Justice: Automation and the New Activism, 67 JUDI-
CATURE 213, 221 (1983).
79. Wallace, Working Paper-Future of the Judiciary, 94 F.R.D. 225, 229 (1981).
80. This is a debatable trade-off. See Mishkin, Observations, 42 TEx. L. REV. 1049, 1050-51 n.3
(1964) (intracircuit conflicts preferable to intercircuit conflicts because former can be resolved by en
bane decision of circuit while latter can be resolved only by Supreme Court); Wright, The Overloaded
Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEx. L. REV. 949, 973-74 (1964) (same).
81. For a review of the various proposals that have been made over the last fifteen years and the
opposition they have provoked, see Meador, The Federal Judiciary-Iflation, Malfunction, and a
Proposed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 625-37. The original proposal for a National
Court of Appeals is over a hundred years old, and was advanced as an alternative to circuit courts of
appeals. See Swygert, The Proposed National Court of Appeals: A Threat to Judicial Symmetry, 51
IND. L.J. 327, 344 n.41 (1976).
82. See S. 455, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S1948, S1956 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983);
H.R. 1970, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H1192-93 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1983). The charac-
teristics of any tribunal that might be created remain uncertain. The original House and Senate bills
closely resemble one another, calling for the creation of a tribunal staffed by twenty-seven or twenty-
eight sitting judges of the courts of appeals, selected by the circuit councils. Cases would be referred to
the new tribunal by the Supreme Court and decided by randomly selected panels of five judges.
Unless modified by the Supreme Court, these decisions would bind the courts of appeals. The pro-
posed tribunal would go out of existence after an experimental period of five years. On June 29,
1983, the Subcommittee on Courts of the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out the Senate version
with substantial amendments. As amended, the Senate bill calls for an en banc court with nine judges
and four alternates, designated by a majority of the Supreme Court and sitting for staggered terms. S.
645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Subomm. Print 1983) (on file with author).
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mageddon is far from universal, and proposals for reform have provoked
spirited opposition. Opponents of the new court argue that its creation
would undermine the Supreme Court's function and sense of responsibil-
ity.83 Some claim that the Supreme Court remains capable of resolving all
"genuine" conflicts. 8' Others contend that divergent interpretations of fed-
eral law actually help the Supreme Court because they fully air issues
before the Court is called upon to decide them.85 It has even been sug-
gested that regional disparities in interpreting federal law are desirable.86
Given this opposition, it is unclear whether Congress will create an In-
tercircuit Tribunal any time soon.
87
Beyond these political considerations, the likelihood that the proposed
Intercircuit Tribunal would eliminate conflicts between the circuits is
small. At best this body would be a stop-gap measure that, with its possi-
bly shifting membership,88 offers little hope for a long-term solution. If a
more permanent court is created some day,89 conflicts between the circuits
Chief Justice Burger has endorsed this temporary measure and urged that another congressional
commission be created to formulate a more permanent solution. See Burger, supra note 1, at 445, 447
(1983). The Chief Justice, however, does not see the proposal as a panacea. On the contrary, his
endorsement is quite qualified: "I assure you at the outset that if I knew precisely how to solve this
problem I would not hesitate to say so, but I do not have the answers." Id. at 444.
83. See Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 473,
480-85 (1973).
84. See G. CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 89-90 (1976);
Hellman, How Not to Help the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 750, 753-54 (1983); Wallace, supra
note 67, at 928-29. Indeed, there is sometimes a dispute about what should be labelled a conflict.
Compare Stern, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARv. L. REv. 465, 472 (1953) (Court
takes factors other than conflict among circuits into account in granting certiorari) with Roehner &
Roehner, Certiorari-What is a Conflict Between Circuits?, 20 U. CHL L. REV. 656, 664 (1953)
(Court grants certiorari whenever there is "head-on collision" between circuits).
85. See Hellman, supra note 76, at 37 ("the judicial system's analogue to the adversary process");
McGarity, Multi.Party Forum Shopping for Appellate Review of Administrative Action, 129 U. PA.
L. REV. 302, 318-19 (1980). For a recent example of this view on the Court, see Justice Stevens'
opinion respecting denial of certiorari in Mcray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438, 2438 (1983) ("I
believe that further consideration of the substantive and procedural ramifications of the problem by
other courts will enable us to deal with the issue more wisely at a later date.").
86. See Hruska Commission, supra note 1, at 235 (rejecting specialized nationwide courts as solu-
tion to burden of appellate caseload because they "would tend to dilute or eliminate regional influence
in the decision of those cases").
87. The pending bills, see supra note 82, have provoked powerful opposition. Justice Stevens and
the Reagan Administration have publicly opposed the House bill, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1983, at
A32, col. 1, and two circuits' chief judges have testified against it, see Four Circuit ChiefJudges Differ
in Congressional Testimony on Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal, 15 THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1983, at 3.
For an academic attack, see Hellman, supra note 76.
88. A system calling for decisions by five judges chosen by lot from among twenty-seven members
of a court with shifting membership, see supra note 82, hardly suggests great consistency of attitude
among panels. Even the Senate's amended bill, proposing a court of nine members and four alternates,
raises substantial concern about variations in personnel. In this connection, it is worth noting that the
congressional commission that studied the problem rejected manning its proposed court on a rotating
basis because "[a] court so composed would lack the stability and continuity that are essential to the
development of national law." Hruska Commission, supra note 1, at 237-38.
89. Congressional action may not occur until the 1990's. To illustrate, in a 1981 article, Professor
Daniel Meador, a proponent of reform, suggested a timetable leading to a legislative solution by 1989.
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will not magically vanish. There will still be a delay between the appear-
ance of a conflict and its resolution by the new tribunal. Moreover, the
new court may be unable to resolve issues as definitively as the Supreme
Court can.90 Perhaps most significantly, the widespread perception among
lawyers that the circuits have different attitudes toward certain issues will
endure.91 Although more frequent review of court of appeals decisions
might iron out such differences,92 the belief that one circuit views particu-
lar claims more charitably than another is likely to persist.
Thus, while modification of the appellate system may reduce conflicts
among circuits,93 incentives to engage in forum shopping will persist. The
question here is not whether such forum shopping is inherently bad, 4 but
only whether the effort to capture a favorable interpretation, or merely a
friendly reception, should be immunized against a transfer from one cir-
cuit to another. The ongoing debate about reforming the federal appellate
machinery is no reason to disregard that question.
See Meador, supra note 81, at 653-58. But his timetable depended on the creation by 1982 of a new
congressional commission to study the issues. This commission was never formed.
90. Even the Supreme Court itself sometimes provides less-than-definitive resolutions of important
questions. See supra p. 688.
91. The existence of such perceptions is difficult to prove, but they do exist. See infra note 159.
This view is confirmed by reports that among lawyers seeking review of action by administrative
agencies, different circuits acquire different reputations. See Brecher, Venue in Conservation Cases: A
Potential Pitfall for Environmental Lau yers, 2 EcoLoGY L.Q. 91, 94 (1972); McGarity, supra note
85, at 310 & n.42; Comment, Forum-Shopping in the Review of NLRB Orders, 28 U. CHi. L. REV.
552, 558-61 (1961); Note, Forum-Shopping in Appellate Review of FTC Cease and Desist Orders,
1968 UTAH L. REV. 316, 316 n.3. Indeed it seems that such perceptions exist inside Congress. See
Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHS. L. REv. 976, 979 (1982) (pro-
posals for venue reform of administrative review motivated by hostility to "liberal" District of Colum-
bia Circuit).
92. See Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court Does
Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 341-42 (1975) (arguing that courts of appeals lack "institutional
responsibility" about avoiding conflicts because they know their decisions will not be reviewed; if ten
percent of court of appeals decisions were reviewed, "the law would soon be clarified and stabilized").
93. Conflicts are easy to identify at present. In the securities area, the courts conflict on whether
the sale of all stock in a business should be treated as a transaction involving the sale of securities
within the meaning of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Compare Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496
(5th Cir. 1983) (sale of 100% of stock is covered by federal securities laws) and Golden v. Garafalo,
678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) (same) with King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982) (sale of
100% of stock not covered by federal securities laws). Similarly, the courts are split on whether re-
spondeat superior is available to establish liability under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Compare Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132-33
(9th Cir.) (respondeat superior inapplicable), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) with Marbury Man-
agement, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.) (respondeat superior applicable), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1011 (1980). In the civil rights area, there is a conflict regarding the res judicata effect in Title
VII cases of determinations of state tribunals. Compare Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60 (2d
Cir.) (per curiam) (res judicata bars subsequent federal action), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979)
with Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972) (res judicata inapplicable). In the
antitrust area, for a survey of different approaches to rule of reason analysis, see Pollock, The Anti-
trust Jurisprudence of the Seventh Circuit, 38 REC. A.B. Crry N.Y. 308, 320-30 (1983).
94. Cf Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 710 (1974) ("[Florum shop-
ping is not an evil per se. It is evil only if something evil flows from it; indeed, the very idea of the
diversity jurisdiction was to provide an alternative to state court.") (footnote omitted).
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IV. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING VAN
DUSEN TO TRANSFERS OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
However troubling conflicts among the circuits may be from the per-
spective of judicial administration, they ordinarily do not present choice-
of-law problems in the resolution of individual cases. Instead, a court ap-
plying federal law to a given case analyzes the strengths and weaknesses
of the contending approaches advanced by the parties. Such analysis often
involves examining relevant decisions by courts in other circuits, but only
as aids to interpretation, not as binding determinations.
A transfer complicates matters, however, when it moves a case from a
circuit in which one interpretation applies to another circuit in which a
conflicting interpretation prevails. As shown in Part III, the number of
intercircuit conflicts is substantial. There is, however, no way to deter-
mine how often a transfer moves a case to a circuit with an interpretation
that conflicts with the transferor's, but the number of transfers of federal
claims is also substantial. In 1965, Professor Edmund Kitch reported that
approximately forty percent of all cases transferred under section 1404(a)
involved claims based on special federal jurisdictional statutes.95 Given the
increase in the number of cases raising federal claims since then,"6 it is
reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of all transfers under
section 1404(a) are federal claims. Transfers of federal claims cases under
the multidistrict litigation statute are also numerous, given the frequency
of multidistrict treatment of securities and antitrust cases."7 Thus sheer
numbers show that the problem is significant.
Before Van Dusen was decided, several lower courts asserted that dif-
ferences in interpretation of federal law were irrelevant to the decision
whether to transfer, and that the transferee court should decide the issues
of federal law without regard to the views of the transferor circuit.9" Van
Dusen was expressly limited to differences in state law,99 but after it was
decided many lower courts concluded-without analysis-that its reason-
ing would govern transferred federal claim cases as well. 00 In many such
95. Kitch, Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice?, 40 IND.
L.J. 99, 137 n.179 (1965).
96. The proportion of civil filings that raise federal claims has steadily increased since the mid-
1960's. See Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 497, 499-500 (1979). For
figures on the number of cases transferred pursuant to § 1404(a) in recent years, see supra note 16.
97. Transfers under the multidistrict litigation statute are particularly frequent in securities and
antitrust cases. Of the 112 groups of transfers ordered by the Multidistrict Panel prior to 1974, 63 (or
56%) were in antitrust or securities litigation. Note, supra note 18, at 1003 n.13.
98. H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928
(1963); Ackert v. Bryan, 299 F.2d 65, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1962); Clayton v. Warlick, 232 F.2d 699, 706
(4th Cir. 1956).
99. 376 U.S. at 625-26, 630, 633, 635, 639.
100. Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 408 n.7 (2d Cir. 1975); Sargent v.
Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 1974); Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 559 n.5
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instances, however, the actual issue was selection of the state law that
would provide the limitations period for the federal claim, not interpreta-
tion of federal law.101 A few lower courts continued to disregard trans-
feror law. 02 None gave the question much attention, however.
To determine whether Van Dusen should apply to the transferred fed-
eral claims, we must analyze the applicability of its rationale to such
cases. An examination of the two principal grounds for that decision-the
Erie doctrine and the notion that the venue privilege gives plaintiff a right
to the transferor court's interpretation-shows that neither provides a ba-
sis for applying Van Dusen to transferred federal claims.
A. The Policy Underlying Erie
Seemingly as a backstop for its acquired rights interpretation of section
1404(a), the Court in Van Dusen explained that its holding "fully
accord[ed] with and is supported by the policy underlying Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins. 1 03 This seems strong support indeed, for Erie looms
over all federal adjudication. 0 4 It has been described as "the most studied
principle in American law '10 5 and the "keystone of the procedure
course." ' Nevertheless, it is irrelevant to the choice-of-law problem with
transferred federal claims for two reasons.
(D.N.J. 1982); Thorn v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 523 F. Supp. 1193, 1198 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 517 F. Supp. 1345, 1346 n.3 (D.D.C. 1981); Campbell v.
Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982); In re
Haven Indus. Sec. Litig., 462 F. Supp. 172, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Oldfield v. Alston, 77 F.R.D. 735,
743 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Brick v. Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 299
(W.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., 11977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,015, at 91,566-67 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 1977); Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp.
1146, 1150 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 511 F.2d 1030 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1396
(2d Cir. 1975); In re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 370 F. Supp. 219, 228 (W.D. Okla. 1974);
Corey v. Bache & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (S.D.W. Va. 1973); In re Plumbing Fixtures Litig.,
342 F. Supp. 756, 758 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1969); cf. Harriman v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 151-52 (D. Del. 1975) (where transferred state claims are pen-
dent to federal claims, Van Dusen applies).
101. See infra pp. 708-09.
102. See Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 11981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) S 98,267, at 91,712 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1981); Scheinbart v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 367
F. Supp. 707, 710-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Without directly addressing the issue, some post-Van Dusen
decisions assume that after a transfer the transferee court would apply its own interpretation of fed-
eral law. See Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F. Supp. 203, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Ziegler v. Dart Indus.,
383 F. Supp. 362, 364-65 (D. Del. 1974) (fact that plaintiff would enjoy favorable change of law due
to transfer insufficient to justify transfer on plaintiff's § 1404(a) motion).
103. 376 U.S. at 637.
104. Cf Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 269 (1946) (ascribing quotation to Learned Hand: "I don't suppose a
civil appeal can now be argued to us without counsel sooner or later quoting large portions of Erie
Railroad z'. Tompkins.").
105. Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH L. REV.
311, 312 (1980).
106. Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011, 1011 (1978).
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First, Erie is limited to issues of state law. The Court there expressly
excluded "matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress" 10 7 from its ruling that federal courts are bound by state law in
other matters. Swift v. Tyson 108 had authorized the federal courts to devise
rules of decision even for issues not governed by federal law. Erie rejected
Swift's premise that there was "a transcendental body of law outside of
any particular State but obligatory within it."'109 As Justice Frankfurter
explained in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, that assumption was stimulated
by "the attractive vision of a uniform body of federal law."' 10 Even
though that vision has been clouded by conflicts between the circuits, mat-
ters are obviously different when the claim arises under federal law.
Thus, while in Guaranty Trust the Court held that in a diversity case a
federal court is required to apply the state's statute of limitations, less
than a year later in Holmberg v. Armbrecht"' the Court emphasized the
difference between federal claims and state claims by holding Erie inap-
plicable to a limitations issue for a federal claim: "The considerations that
urge adjudication by the same law in all courts within a State when en-
forcing a right created by that State are hardly relevant for determining
the rules which bar enforcement of an equitable right created not by a
State legislature but by Congress."'1 2 Erie simply does not apply to fed-
eral claims.
Second, the "policy underlying Erie," cited by the Court in Van Du-
sen, 13 is also irrelevant. Identifying Erie's policy is not an easy matter;
debate about the importance of various proffered policies continues."' But
it is enough for present purposes to analyze two of Erie's concerns that
pertain to the transfer situation." 5 First, as Justice Brandeis emphasized
107. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
108. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
109. 304 U.S. 64, 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
110. 326 U.S. 99, 103 (1945).
111. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
112. Id. at 394.
113. The Court referred to the policy underlying Erie when deciding Van Dusen, 376 U.S. 637,
but the issue in Van Dusen is outside the normal Erie debate whether a federal or state rule should be
applied to a certain issue. In Van Dusen, there was no question that state law should govern; the only
question was which state's law.
114. Compare Ely, supra note 94, at 712-13 (emphasizing fairness to litigants) with Redish &
Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 356, 376-77 (1977) (arguing that fairness to litigants is not significant).
115. One oft-mentioned Erie concern-deterring forum shopping-seems to have little relevance
and was not alluded to by the Court in Van Dusen. Presumably the reason is that any rule promotes
one type of forum shopping and prevents another. Thus, the Court's holding in Van Dusen overtly
protects the benefits of plaintiffs' forum shopping (under the acquired rights rubric) and precludes
forum shopping by defendants via § 1404(a) motions. The opposite holding would, of course, have
reduced the incentives for plaintiffs to forum shop and increased the incentive for defendants to use
§ 1404(a) motions for that purpose.
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in Erie, it is unfair to discriminate between those who can gain admission
to federal court on the basis of diversity and those who are confined to
state court by the fortuity of their residence."' 6 So viewed, Erie seeks to
assure that the result would be the same in either court. Second, Erie
guards the integrity of state policy. As the Court explained in Klaxon, it
"leaves to a state . . . the right to pursue local policies diverging from
those of its neighbors.""'
The Van Dusen Court rightly concluded that these concerns would be
imperiled if courts interpreted section 1404(a) to give defendants "a
change of law as a bonus for a change of venue" in transferred diversity
cases. 18 Had Massachusetts law been substituted for Pennsylvania law in
Van Dusen because of a transfer, which would not have been available in
state court, the outcome would have been different due to the accident of
diversity that allowed the case into federal court.119 Allowing the "proce-
dural" device of transfer to effect such a change in the substantive law
would unfairly distinguish between litigants on the basis of residence and
thus would violate the first principle of Erie.
A change from Pennsylvania law to Massachusetts law would also
threaten the policies and interests of Pennsylvania. At the time the Court
decided Van Dusen, it was unclear whether the Pennsylvania courts
would choose to apply their own measure of damages or the Massachu-
setts measure.12 1 Subsequent developments indicated that the Penn-
sylvania courts would apply their own law, 2' thereby showing Penn-
sylvania's interest in assuring compensation. Substituting Massachusetts'
truncated measure of damages would have frustrated that interest. This
protection of state policy is also consistent with Erie.
116. For a criticism of this concern, see Redish & Phillips, supra note 114, at 376-77.
117. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), quoted in Van Dusen, 376
U.S. at 638 n.38.
118. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting), quoted
in Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636 n.33.
119. Arguably the availability of transfer itself raises Erie problems in diversity cases, but as a
"judicial housekeeping" matter regulating venue in the federal system, the statute surely may be ap-
plied in diversity cases despite Erie. See supra p. 685. Given this interpretation, § 1404(a) must be
within Congress' power under article I of the Constitution, just as the Rules Enabling Act was, and
therefore the application of the transfer statute to diversity cases is proper despite Erie. See Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). By way of contrast, the question whether common law forum non
conveniens is governed by state law or federal law in diversity cases has yet to be resolved by the
Supreme Court. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981). Commentators have
concluded, however, that forum non conveniens is a matter of federal law in diversity cases. See 15
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 14, § 3847, at 237-39; 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, supra note 34, 0.145 [3.-11, at 1584.
120. See 376 U.S. at 628-29.
121. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). On remand in Van
Dusen, the district judge read Griffith as indicating that Pennsylvania would apply -its own law, but
also acknowledged that "Griffith is still a mystery to us." Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, 253 F. Supp.
244, 249 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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These same considerations do not apply to federal claims. The problem
of unfairness vanishes because all litigants can gain access to federal court
regardless of citizenship.122 Concerns over state policy are similarly unim-
portant where federal claims are involved. If state policies are inconsistent
with federal law, they must give way under the supremacy clause. 2
Moreover, there is no federal or circuit interest in the application of a
particular interpretation of federal law that is analogous to the interest a
state might have in the application of its law to a particular case. Indeed,
because the lower federal courts are to construe federal law independently,
the true federal interest is having the court which decides the case apply
its own interpretation of federal law.
B. Acquired Rights and the "Venue Privilege"
Van Dusen emphasized the advantages flowing from exercise of plain-
tiff's "venue privilege" as a predicate for its holding that, as to issues of
state law, Congress did not intend a transfer under section 1404(a) to
eliminate those advantages. 12 4 But Van Dusen did not articulate any theo-
retical basis for concluding that, by exercising the venue privilege, plain-
tiff acquires the right to have a certain state's law apply. Analysis ulti-
mately leads to the conclusion that there is none. Instead, the Court's
emphasis on the venue privilege appears to result from the absence of
federal principles for choice of state law, turning the selection of law into
a game of chess in which the plaintiff gets the opening move. 25 The over-
lay of a federal system that permits transfer to a court sitting in a differ-
ent state makes the value of that first move even more significant by pre-
cluding dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens which would result
in a change of law.
The plaintiff's venue privilege and the resultant choice-of-law advan-
tages are deeply ingrained in our jurisprudential psyche. Professor Moore,
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (federal question jurisdiction); id. § 1441(a)
(1976) (removal jurisdiction). For an expansion of this argument, see Westen & Lehman, supra note
105, at 378-85.
Arguably the potential for a change in result due to the transfer of a federal claim from one circuit
to another creates an analogous risk of unfairness, but this issue has no bearing on the discussion in
the text for two reasons. First, the "unfairness" does not result from the accident of diversity and it is
therefore not the same as the Erie concern. Second, and more important, there is simply no unfairness
in view of the principle of competence discussed infra at Part V. To the contrary, parties have no
right to select a preferred interpretation of federal law. See infra pp. 706-07. Where the initial forum
is sufficiently inconvenient to justify a transfer, the parties can hardly object to a possible difference in
interpretation of federal law.
123. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
124. See 376 U.S. at 633-34.
125. Cf Currie, supra note 38, at 441 (describing change of venue as "game of chess, with Sec-
tion 1404(a) authorizing a knight's move; and nothing would be certain except that the parties would
land on a square of a different color") (footnote omitted), quoted in Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636 n.34.
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who originally proposed section 1404(a), has argued that even where
plaintiff himself moves to transfer he should be permitted to keep the state
law of the original forum so long as it was a proper venue."2" He reasons
that plaintiff has a right to insist on keeping the case there (or make de-
fendant move to transfer, thereby invoking Van Dusen), so that the fact
that plaintiff takes the initiative regarding transfer should be unimportant.
Another commentator has suggested that even if the state in which the
case was originally filed would dismiss on grounds of forum non con-
veniens, the applicable state law should remain unchanged after a transfer
under section 1404(a). 27 The argument is that the state court dismisses
only because it has no other way to move the case to the appropriate
forum, not to effect a change in law. Since section 1404(a) allows such a
transfer in the federal court system, the incidental change of law that at-
tends a dismissal need not carry over into the federal system. Thus, there
is a pervasive inclination to leave the choice of state law to the plaintiff if
he complies with venue and jurisdictional limitations.
The problem with this approach is that choice-of-law decisions do not
flow naturally from venue provisions. Although a determination of venue
may involve some considerations pertinent to choice of law, venue tradi-
tionally has focused on geographic convenience to defendant by limiting
the number of locations in which plaintiff may file suit.' Venue reform
has therefore addressed the relative burdens on plaintiffs and defendants
of litigating at a distance. When Congress has concluded that the burden
was unfair to plaintiffs it has expanded the number of venues available to
the plaintiff, as it did by amending the Federal Employer's Liability
Act 12  and by enacting a broad general venue provision for suits against
corporations. °30 This focus on geographical convenience is also reflected in
forum non conveniens decisions, where courts repeatedly emphasize the
legitimacy of plaintiffs' decisions to sue at home.' Identifying the con-
126. 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 34, % 0.145 [4.-5], at 1608; see Note, Choice of
Lau, in Federal Court After Transfer of Venue, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 149, 157-58 (1977). But see 15
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 14, § 3846, at 234; Currie, The Federal Courts
and the American Lauw Institute: Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 310 (1969). In Van Dusen the
Court reserved this question. See supra p. 685.
127. Note, Erie, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law in Diversity Cases, 53 VA. L. REV.
380, 390-91 (1967). Where either jurisdiction or venue was improper in the original venue, however,
a transfer works a change of law. E.g., Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir.
1983); Ellis v. Great Southwestern Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1109-11 (5th Cir. 1981).
128. See generally 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 14, § 3801, at 4; 1
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 34, 0.140 [1.-1].
129. See 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976). For a discussion of the unfairness to plaintiffs that led to the
broad venue provision, see Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 49-50 (1941).
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1976). For a discussion of the inconvenience to plaintiffs before
§ 1391(c) was added in 1948, see 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 14, § 3811, at
551; MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 34, 1 0.140 [1.-l].
131. E.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981); Koster v. Lumbermens
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venient or fair location for a suit, however, has no inherent connection to
selecting the source of law that should govern the case. In expanding the
available venues under the F.E.L.A., for example, Congress sought to re-
lieve plaintiffs of the burden of traveling long distances to sue their em-
ployers, not to enable them to travel long distances to capture favorable
law. With improvements in transportation and communication, however,
it has become increasingly easy for plaintiffs to roam far afield to do pre-
cisely that.
Transfer of venue brings the intended and unintended effects of broad
venue into sharp and ironic focus. As Professor Edmund Kitch has ob-
served, "the congressional policy of the venue provision to favor the plain-
tiff is in irreconcilable conflict with the congressional policy incorporated
in the transfer section to protect the defendant against an inconvenient
forum. 1' 32 The transfer section is intended, on a case-by-case basis, to
accomplish the original objective of venue provisions and limit a plaintiff's
ability to impose undue geographical burdens on a defendant. Once plain-
tiff's original choice of forum has been overridden by a transfer, the rea-
son for giving plaintiff a broad choice of venues in the first place ceases to
apply. Indeed, any connection between the convenience of the forum and
the choice of law would point to preferring the law of the transferee. Iron-
ically, however, even though his choice of location has been taken away
from him, plaintiff's incidental choice of law is still protected under a
theory of acquired rights.
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,1"3 a 1981 Supreme Court decision, shows
that there is little inherent force to the acquired rights notion, particularly
when balanced against concerns about forum shopping. In Piper, the
Court held that the prospect of a significant change in law is immaterial
to the decision whether to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens.
The claims there arose out of an airplane crash in Scotland that killed five
Scottish citizens. Since Scottish law apparently did not authorize product
liability claims, plaintiffs hired a California lawyer, 13 who had his secre-
tary appointed administratrix of the estates of the decedents to take advan-
tage of American strict liability law.1 5 The secretary-administratrix filed
Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1947).
132. Kitch, supra note 95, at 137; see also von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theo-
ries Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REV. 279, 324 (1983).
133. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
134. There is no explanation in the record of how plaintiffs' relationship with the California
lawyer was established, but it appears that this was not the only such action he handled. In Whyham
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 96 F.R.D. 557 (M.D. Pa. 1982), the same lawyer brought suit on behalf of
persons killed in another accident in Scotland. Noting that Reyno involved "facts nearly identical to
this action," id. at 562, the district court dismissed. This case lends credence to the Court's concern
about a substantial influx of foreign litigation into the United States.
135. Plaintiff acknowledged that the suit was filed in the United States to take advantage of
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wrongful death claims in California state court against Piper, which man-
ufactured the plane, and an Ohio company that manufactured the propel-
ler. Venue was proper under California law anywhere in the state, be-
cause neither defendant was a California resident,1"6 but the Ohio
company was not subject to personal jurisdiction in California. Defen-
dants removed to federal court, obtained a transfer under section 1404(a)
to Pennsylvania, and then moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds because Scotland would be a more convenient forum. The district
court granted defendants' motion, but the Third Circuit reversed on the
theory that dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens was not permis-
sible if the consequence would be an adverse change of law for plaintiff.137
Without dissent,138 the Supreme Court rejected the Third Circuit's po-
sition and held that no substantial weight should be given to the prospect
of a change of law in deciding a forum non conveniens motion. 39 In part,
the Court reacted to the spectre that large numbers of foreign plaintiffs
injured by products manufactured in the United States would sue in this
country to take advantage of favorable American products liability law.1 40
Implicitly, however, the Court also rejected a broad view of the notion
that a plaintiff who has sued in a proper venue acquires a right to the law
applied there. By the time the motion to dismiss was decided in the Penn-
sylvania district court, both venue and jurisdiction requirements were un-
questionably satisfied. Plaintiff had exercised her "venue privilege," and
had even advanced an arguable American interest in application of Amer-
ican product liability laws: Since American firms market their products
domestically as well as overseas, American courts should apply domestic
law to deter the harmful activities giving rise to the claim and thereby
protect American citizens.
1 41
The Court was unpersuaded. It held that where trial in the forum se-
lected by the plaintiff would impose a heavy burden on the defendant or
American law. See 454 U.S. at 240.
136. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 395(a) (West 1973 & Supp. 1983).
137. 630 F.2d 149, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1980), ret,'d, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Judge Henry Friendly
has questioned the Supreme Court's characterization of the Third Circuit decision as relying entirely
on the change in law. See Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 749 & n.4
(1982).
138. Neither Justice Powell nor Justice O'Connor took part in the decision. Justices Brennan,
White, and Stevens joined the Court in rejecting the Third Circuit's reliance on the potential change
in the law but dissented from the majority's decision to go on and decide other matters. See 454 U.S.
at 261-62.
139. The Court did acknowledge that a change in law would be significant if, as a result of
dismissal, plaintiff were "deprived of any remedy." Id. at 254-55. It is not clear whether that reason-
ing would apply if, for example, the foreign jurisdiction would hold the claim barred by the statute of
limitations.
140. See 454 U.S. at 251-52.
141. Id. at 260-61. The Court found that "the incremental deterrence that would be gained if this
trial were held in an American court is likely to be insignificant." Id.
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the court, dismissal would be proper unless plaintiff could offer "specific
reasons of convenience supporting his choice." '142 Such a showing would
be difficult, the Court suggested, where plaintiff chose the forum "solely
in order to . . . take advantage of favorable law. 143 Further, noting that
due to broad venue provisions plaintiffs would ordinarily choose the fo-
rum with favorable law, 144 it emphasized that "the deference accorded a
plaintiff's choice of forum has never been intended to guarantee that the
plaintiff will be able to select the law that will govern the case.' 14 Rather
than condone use of the venue privilege to capture favorable law, the
Court condemned it. The Court distinguished Van Dusen on the ground
that a dismissal for forum non conveniens differed from a transfer under
section 1404(a) because the latter allowed "easy change of venue within a
unified federal system."' 14" Although the international character of Reyno
did distinguish it from section 1404(a) situations,14 7 at bottom the case
showed that the Court places little faith in the acquired rights theory.
Why then did Van Dusen place such emphasis on acquired rights? The
answer is essentially the reason Professor Currie eventually threw up his
hands in despair: There are no federal choice-of-law principles that favor
application of the law of one state over the law of another.' 48 Admittedly,
the due process clause does prevent a state from applying its own law to a
case with which it has no substantial contacts. 4 9 But a number of states
142. Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 249 n.15.
144. Id. at 250.
145. Id. at 257 n.24.
146. Id. at 253-54. In part this reasoning relied on the need for a stronger showing of inconven-
ience to justify a forum non conveniens dismissal than a transfer under § 1404(a). But even where a
showing sufficient to justify dismissal has been made, dismissal is not allowed if the case can be
transferred to the more convenient forum. See supra p. 683. Thus the difference in showing required
has little to do with preservation of the advantage gained by plaintiff's exercise of the venue privilege.
147. The opinion in Reyno stated that the district court had been "fully justified" in giving the
plaintiff's choice of venue less weight because the real parties in interest were "foreign." 454 U.S. at
255. The Court reasoned that "[w]hen the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume
that this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less
reasonable." Id. at 255-56. This reasoning applies, of course, whether the plaintiff is a non-American
or an Alaskan suing in Florida. Because Justices Brennan, White, and Stevens dissented from this
portion of the opinion, on the ground that it was beyond the question presented for review, only four
Justices joined it. See id. at 261-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan, J.); id. at 261
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, this aspect of the opinion hardly
detracts from the actual holding that a plaintiff's desire to shop for favorable law is entitled to little
consideration.
148. The argument made in the text does not require acceptance of Currie's state interest view.
Many scholars reject his theories and contend that sensible rules of choice of law can be developed.
For a survey of the ongoing debate, see Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM.
L. REv. 772 (1983); Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUhf. L. REv. 946
(1981). The point here is that, absent action by Congress, the federal courts have no body of such
rules to apply and must, under Klaxon, defer to the choice-of-law rules of the states in which they sit.
149. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (existence of minimum contacts
with forum state justifies interpretation of insurance policy under that state's law); Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (state may not affect rights under insurance contract where parties are
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are likely to have sufficient contacts to satisfy the due process minimum
where there is a genuine choice-of-law issue. Although Congress probably
has the power to legislate binding choice-of-law rules,150 it has not done
so. The venue privilege therefore prevails by default; choice-of-law issues
in diversity cases are determined by venue provisions, even though venue
was originally intended to accomplish entirely different objectives. But the
acquired rights theory should not establish an affirmative principle to gov-
ern transferred federal claims unless there is a similar vacuum in that
situation. There is not, since applicable federal principles do exist.
V. FEDERAL PRINCIPLES FAVORING TRANSFEREE INTERPRETATION
AFTER TRANSFER OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
Concluding that the core principles of Van Dusen are inapplicable to
the choice-of-law problems presented by transfers of federal claim cases
does little to identify more appropriate governing principles. 5 Some sug-
beyond its borders and have no contacts with it). For criticisms of the reasoning in Allstate, see
Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79
MICH. L. REv. 1315 (1981); Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate: The Lessening of Due Process in Choice
of Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 889 (1981). In Headrick, discussed supra pp. 682-83, a good argument
could be made that due process would forbid application of the New Mexico statute of limitations.
150. See Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23 (1963) (finding
such power in full faith and credit clause); Currie, supra note 38, at 468-69 (finding such power in
necessary and proper clause).
151. At the outset, it is worthwhile to reject special federal venue statutes as grounds for deciding
the issue in cases based on statutory schemes with such provisions. Several federal statutory schemes,
such as the Federal Employers' Liability Act (F.E.L.A.), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1976), and the Clayton
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982), do have their own venue provisions which apply in place of the
general venue provisions. One could argue that these federal pronouncements represent decisions by
Congress to allow plaintiffs to choose the interpretations of federal law that should govern their cases.
This view is supported by Supreme Court decisions holding that, in the face of such congressional
decisions to broaden venue, the federal courts could not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds if a
case were filed in a proper venue. Thus, in United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948)
(National City Lines I), the Court held that forum non conveniens could not be applied to an anti-
trust action. It reasoned that "the choice of venues expressly given to the plaintiff is not to be qualified
by any power of a court having venue," id. at 578, because Congress' purpose in providing broad
venue was "to provide broader and more effective relief, both substantively and procedurally, for
persons injured by violations of its antitrust policy." Id. at 581 (footnote omitted). It reached a similar
conclusion with regard to the F.E.L.A. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941); cf
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976) (narrow venue of National Bank Act,
currently codified at 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1982), permits securities action against bank only in district in
which bank is established, notwithstanding broad venue of securities acts).
In view of the Court's reference in National City Lines I to Congress' desire to provide broader
relief "substantively," one might argue that the Court believed that Congress approved of forum shop-
ping for favorable interpretations of federal law. The argument is not persuasive. First, the Court
held that § 1404(a) is not similarly limited. In United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78
(1949) (National City Lines 11), decided less than a year after National City Lines I, it upheld
transfer of the same case under § 1404(a). There is no question that such cases can be transferred
pursuant to the multidistrict transfer statute, see supra note 97 (detailing number of transfers of
antitrust cases). Due to the special venue provision in antitrust cases, the burden of justifying a
§ 1404(a) transfer may be heavier than in other litigation. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497, 500 (C.D. Cal. 1981). Nevertheless, as with
other venue matters, see supra pp. 697-98, once plaintiff's geographical choice is overridden the
The Yale Law Journal
gest that conflicts between the circuits reflect efforts to deal with local
problems, 152 but no federal doctrine prefers the interpretation of the cir-
cuit in which the transactions underlying the case occurred. To the con-
trary, the applicable interpretation is that of the circuit in which the case
is filed unless the case is transferred. One must therefore look beyond
choice of law to locate an applicable federal principle.
Such a principle stems from the very source of the problem of conflicts
between circuits-the system of review established by the Evarts Act.
153
That system assumes that the courts of appeals are competent to decide
questions of federal law correctly and mandates that they do so, subject
only to review by the Supreme Court. 54 This principle of competence
undercuts any rule that would require the transferee court to follow an-
other circuit's interpretation of federal law. Neither the legislative history
nor the policy of the transfer statutes provides a reason for overriding this
principle.
A. The Principle of Competence
For federal courts, the most significant choice-of-law difference between
issues of state law and issues of federal law is that they lack competence to
decide the former and are presumptively competent to decide the latter.
Swift v. Tyson held that federal courts were competent to develop rules of
decision for issues of state law. Erie unequivocally rejected that proposi-
tion and reserved such determinations for the states. The situation is ma-
terially different for issues of federal law, which the federal courts have
not only the power but the duty to decide correctly. There is no room in
the federal system of review for rote acceptance of the decision of a court
outside the chain of direct review. If a federal court simply accepts the
interpretation of another circuit without addressing the merits, it is not
doing its job.
This principle follows naturally from the structure of appellate review
venue choice should have little impact on choice of law.
Second, as described infra pp. 707-08, the congressional regulatory goal actually cuts in favor of
the principle of competence and against emphasizing plaintiff's interest.
152. See supra p. 690.
153. The Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891, supra note 59.
154. A somewhat analogous choice-of-law principle, the supposed propriety of preferring a "bet-
ter" rule of law, has been suggested as a legitimate factor in selecting rules to decide cases governed by
state law. See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267,
295-304 (1966). The notion seems to be that enlightened judges can thereby sidestep anachronistic
rules of law by choosing to apply the modern law of another state. Not surprisingly, this concept has
been criticized as overly subjective. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.11 (1982). But
with issues of federal law in the federal system, an analogous notion is proper under the principle of
competence: The forum circuit's interpretation is always the better law because it is, in the eyes of the
forum court, the correct one.
702
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established by the Evarts Act. Despite early doubts,155 the independence
of the circuits was quickly established. Thus, in a 1908 case, the Seventh
Circuit, after noting that the contentions made by the appellant had all
been rejected by the Second Circuit, agreed that appellant "is right in
claiming that he is entitled to our independent consideration and judg-
ment."' 56 It then analyzed the issues and reached the same result as the
Second Circuit.15 7 The important point, however, is that the Seventh Cir-
cuit was not content simply to accept the Second Circuit's decision. It
thereby affirmed the rule of competence that has endured to the present.
Appropriately, the principle is dramatically illustrated by an important
transfer case, Hoffman v. Blaski.'58 Plaintiffs there sued in Texas, defen-
dants' residence. The district court granted defendants' motion to transfer
to Illinois, plaintiffs' residence,"5 9 under section 1404(a). Claiming that
section 1404(a) did not authorize the transfer because jurisdiction and
venue were not proper in Illinois, plaintiffs petitioned the Fifth Circuit
for a writ of mandamus. That court of appeals denied the petition,
squarely holding that the transfer was proper because defendants agreed
to waive jurisdictional objections.'"0 After the case was transferred, plain-
tiffs moved to remand it to Texas on the same grounds that the Fifth
Circuit had rejected. The Seventh Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, and
granted their petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that it was not
bound by the Fifth Circuit decision: "[W]e think the decision of the Fifth
Circuit in this matter is erroneous. Such being the case, we are under no
more obligation to follow it as the law of the case than that Circuit would
155. In Fairfield Floral Co. v. Bradbury, 87 F. 415 (C.C.D. Me. 1898), the court opined that
"[mly own view is that the decisions of the court of appeals in one circuit should ordinarily be fol-
lowed quite implicitly by the courts in other circuits." Id. at 417; accord Hale v. Hilliker, 109 F. 273
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1901), re,'d, 117 F. 220 (2d Cir. 1902), cert. denied, 188 U.S. 739 (1903).
156. Heckendorn v. United States, 162 F. 141, 143 (7th Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 514
(1909).
157. Id.
158. 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
159. It may initially seem odd that plaintiffs would oppose transfer to their home district, much
less go to the effort of petitioning two courts of appeals to vindicate their right to remain in the
defendants' home district. But plaintiffs' behavior demonstrates that modification of the federal appel-
late structure probably will not entirely eliminate forum shopping. Plaintiffs in Hoffinan charged the
defendants with violating plaintiffs' patent. The Seventh Circuit had long been regarded as tough on
plaintiffs asserting claims under patents, and quick to hold patents invalid. Thus, plaintiffs' efforts to
keep the case out of their home district presumably reflected their desire to avoid the Seventh Circuit.
As indicated above, see supra pp. 690-91, such perceived differences between circuits will not change
if a new court is added to the appellate system. With patents, the matter has been resolved by shifting
all appellate jurisdiction in patent cases to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, see Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37-39 (1982), but relying
on specialized courts with nationwide authority is not an attractive solution to the general problem of
intercircuit conflicts.
160. Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737, 738 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub noun. Blaski v. Davidson, 355
U.S. 872 (1957).
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be to follow what it considers an erroneous decision by this court."'81 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Seventh Circuit." 2
Whatever the merit of the Seventh Circuit's disregard of the law of the
case,163 Hoffman v. Blaski makes clear that one circuit need not follow a
decision of another circuit that it regards as erroneous. 6 Accordingly,
even those circuits that stress the need for uniformity in federal law say
that they will not follow erroneous decisions of other circuits.'
6 5
The principle of competence applies even to the decision of federal is-
sues by state courts.'66 Indeed, until 1875, state courts were the only
courts with general jurisdiction over federal claims,16 7 and the federal
161. Blaski v. Hoffman, 260 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir. 1958) (citation omitted), aff'd, 363 U.S. 335
(1960).
162. 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
163. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the Seventh Circuit could not reconsider the
issue decided by the Fifth Circuit. See 363 U.S. at 345, 347-48 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also
Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 170 (3d Cir. 1982) (erroneous to retransfer,
despite fact that statute did not authorize transfer in first place, because issue was already decided by
transferor court and thus was law of case). But Justice Frankfurter did not contend that, absent law
of the case, the Seventh Circuit would be obligated to follow the Fifth Circuit interpretation.
164. For a recent example, see Newsweek v. United States Postal Serv., 663 F.2d 1186, 1196 (2d
Cir. 1981) (Second Circuit rejects District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation of 39 U.S.C.
§ 3622(b) (1976)), aff'd sub nomn. National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States
Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 2717 (1983).
165. See North Am. Life & Casualty Co. v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1046, 1051 (8th Cir. 1976)
(in area of taxation, decision of other circuits "should be followed unless they are demonstrably erro-
neous or there appear cogent reasons for rejecting them") (citations omitted).
166. The rule of competence applies as well to federal court determinations of questions of state
law. See Plant v. Blazer Fin. Serv., 598 F.2d 1357, 1363 (5th Cir. 1979) ("diversity jurisdiction
presumes federal courts' competence to decide state law issues"). Federal courts must interpret the
state law themselves when there is no definitive interpretation from the supreme court of the state.
When interpreting state law, federal courts usually do not defer to one another. Waters v. American
Auto Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 684, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Some courts will defer to an interpretation of
state law by a district judge who sits in that state, on the theory that he is more familiar with it. See
C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 375-76 (4th ed. 1983). Otherwise it is the
responsibility of each federal court to make its own interpretation of uncertain state law rather than
following the interpretation of another federal court.
For a break with this approach, see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982), in which a sharply divided panel of the Second Circuit
decided to defer to a decision of the Sixth Circuit on an unsettled question of Tennessee law because
Tennessee is in the Sixth Circuit. In dissent, Judge Mansfield chastised the majority for "blindly
following" the Sixth Circuit, 652 F.2d at 284, asserting that the Second Circuit is "as fully qualified
effectively to 'declare' Tennessee law in such fashion as our sister circuit" and that it should therefore
"so hold rather than retreat behind unsupportable deferential niceties." Id. at 286. For criticism of the
decision, see Note, Circuit Court of Appeals Must Accord Conclusive Deference to Another Circuit's
Determination of the Law of a State Within the Other Circuit: Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 67
CORNELL L. REV. 415 (1982). The existence of a debate even as to interpretation of state law shows
that the principle of competence is firmly entrenched.
167. In the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875), Congress expanded the jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts to almost the full extent of the constitutional authorization, limiting it
only with provisions such as amount in controversy. Until then, the federal courts had jurisdiction
only over diversity cases and a few limited headings of federal question matters-admiralty, patent,
and bankruptcy. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 57, at 65-69; Stolz, Federal Review
of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CA-
LsF. L. REv. 943, 949 (1976) (referring to "enormous area in which state courts were thought fully
competent to articulate federal law").
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courts have never had jurisdiction over cases involving anticipated federal
defenses to state law claims in the absence of diversity of citizenship.168
Today, except for claims within exclusive federal jurisdiction, the state
courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims and must there-
fore frequently decide issues of federal law.169 Subject to review by the
Supreme Court,170 they are competent to do so, and there is accordingly
no requirement that they accept the interpretation of any lower federal
court.1 ' In fact, a series of recent Supreme Court decisions emphasizes
the right and responsibilty of state courts to decide federal issues without
interference from the lower federal courts.
17 2
As Hoffman v. Blaski illustrates, 17 3 this principle of competence applies
as forcefully to a transferred case as to any other case involving an issue
on which the circuits conflict. After transfer, the transferee court has the
same right and duty to decide the transferred federal claim on its own as
it has in every other case. This proposition found expression in a number
of pre-Van Dusen cases. For example, in Ackert v. Bryan,17 4 the Second
168. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). At times, the Supreme Court has
chafed at these limitations, particularly where they interfere with the uniformity of national law. See
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2843 (1983) ("The
issue is an important one, which affects thousands of federally regulated trusts and all non-federal tax
collection systems, and it must eventually receive a definitive, uniform resolution. Nevertheless, for
reasons involving perhaps more history than logic, we hold that the lower federal courts had no
jurisdiction to decide the question in the case before us .... ").
169. See Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MIcH.
L. REv. 311 (1976).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
171. As Professor Stolz has argued, the absence of scrutiny by any lower federal court argues in
favor of creation of a national court of appeals to review state court decisions in federal question cases.
Stolz, supra note 167, at 964-74.
172. Because civil cases raising federal claims can generally be removed to federal court, see supra
p. 696, the cases in which the Court has articulated its confidence in state court disposition of federal
issues, not surprisingly, have involved state criminal proceedings. Beginning with Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court has on several occasions overturned federal court orders that interdicted
state court criminal proceedings claimed to infringe the federal constitutional rights of the state court
defendants. As the Court explained, Younger was intended to "permit state courts to try state cases
free from interference by federal courts." Id. at 43. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the
Court held that a federal court could not issue a writ of habeas corpus based on a claim that evidence
used in a state criminal proceeding was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment if the state court
had accorded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim of illegal seizure. It noted that "[s]tate
courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to up-
hold federal law." Id. at 494 n.35 (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-44
(1816)). In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), the Court took another step toward insulating
state court criminal judgments against collateral attack in federal court by holding that, in an action
for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), collateral estoppel could foreclose relitigation of the
constitutionality of seizure of evidence. It rejected the argument that by enacting § 1983 Congress
intended to abrogate the general rule that state court determinations should be accorded full faith and
credit in federal court. Id. at 105. To the contrary, it pointed to "this Court's emphatic reaffirmation
in [Stone v. Powell] of the constitutional obligation of the state courts to uphold federal law, and its
expression of confidence in their ability to do so." Id.
173. See supra pp. 703-04.
174. 299 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1962).
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Circuit was asked to overturn an order transferring a case to the District
of Minnesota in the Eighth Circuit. Plaintiff, a stockholder asserting a
claim under the Investment Company Act of 1940, x75 argued that transfer
was improper because the Eighth Circuit did not allow a stockholder to
sue under that statute, while the Second Circuit did. Since transfer would
therefore be tantamount to dismissal of his claim, plaintiff contended it
was unauthorized because Minnesota was not a district in which the ac-
tion could have been brought, as required by section 1404(a).1 78 The Sec-
ond Circuit accepted arguendo that the law of the Eighth Circuit was as
plaintiff pictured it,177 but remained unmoved. It assumed that the trans-
feree court would apply the Eighth Circuit interpretation but held that
any difference in outcome did not present "a true conflict of laws prob-
lem,' 17 but rather a matter to be resolved by the Supreme Court. 79 Not
even plaintiff suggested that the federal court in Minnesota should apply
the Second Circuit interpretation after transfer.
More significantly, in H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon,8 0 a case the Su-
preme Court cited and quoted in Van Dusen,"'8 the Second Circuit con-
firmed in dictum that litigants have no vested right in a particular inter-
pretation of federal law:
A plaintiff may not resist the transfer of his action to another dis-
trict court on the ground that the transferee court will or may inter-
pret federal law in a manner less favorable to him . . . .The fed-
eral courts comprise a single system applying a single body of law,
and no litigant has a right to have the interpretation of one federal
court rather than that of another determine his case.
18 2
The assumption that each federal court is competent to decide federal
questions is therefore inconsistent with preserving the selection of a given
circuit's interpretation, just as it is inconsistent with an attempt to select a
particular federal judge. 8 In each instance, the system abhors efforts to
175. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (1982).
176. 299 F.2d at 69.
177. The court also indicated that it was not fully persuaded plaintiff was right about the Eighth
Circuit view. See id.
178. Id. (citing E. CHEATHAM, H. GOODRICH, E. GRISWOLD & W. REESE, CASES AND MATER-
IALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 585-86 (4th ed. 1957)).
179. 299 F.2d at 70.
180. 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).
181. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 632-33 (1964).
182. 312 F.2d at 652; accord Clayton v. Warlick, 232 F.2d 699, 706 (4th Cir. 1956).
183. Within a given district, lawyers may be tempted to try to have a case assigned to a judge
whom they view as receptive to their cause. Cf. J. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS 11-20, 114-57
(1974) (describing disparities in quality among federal judges). Nevertheless, such efforts are properly
spurned on the ground that all judges are competent to decide cases. See Shopping for a Judge?, Nat'l
L.J., Apr. 11, 1983, at 2, col. 2 (describing disciplinary action against lawyer for apparent judge
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undermine the authority of the assigned court to decide the case correctly
on the merits.
Emphasizing the competence of federal courts rather than the plaintiff's
interest in the most favorable interpretation of federal law also accords
with the objectives of many federal statutes that Congress designed not
only to provide compensation but also to achieve federal regulatory goals.
For example, private claims for violation of the antitrust laws are meant
to aid enforcement of those statutes,184 and the private remedies provisions
of the civil rights acts similarly were designed to assist efforts against ra-
cial discrimination. 8 5 The point is especially important where the courts
have themselves implied a right to sue for damages in order to further
congressional regulatory objectives. 86 In such circumstances, compensa-
tion is not the primary purpose of the private claim. In view of the regula-
tory objectives of many federal claims, it is inappropriate to give substan-
tial weight to plaintiffs' attempts to capture a certain interpretation of
federal law.
1 87
shopping in Central District of California); see also Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F. Supp. 203
(S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 623 F.2d 1387 (2d Cir. 1980), where the court denied defendants' motion to
transfer to the Northern District of New York, but observed:
Had plaintiffs selected this forum to avoid specific precedents in the Northern District, the
case for a transfer would have been far stronger. Just as this district's local rules are designed
to prevent shopping for individual judges-and thereby for the application of some anticipated
view of the law-efforts to select one district to avoid or to obtain specific rulings of another
district court should be disfavored and discouraged.
Id. at 215; accord Semmes Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1203 (2d Cir. 1970); In re
Texas Gulf Sulphur Sec. Litig., 344 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972); cf Deposit Guar.
Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339-40 (1980) ("Permitting appeal of the district court's certifi-
cation ruling. . . also minimizes problems raised by 'forum shopping' by putative class representa-
tives attempting to locate a judge perceived as sympathetic to class actions.").
184. The courts have repeatedly emphasized the important role of private plaintiffs in enforcing
the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947);
Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
185. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 (1980) (main goal "to override the corrupting influ-
ence of the Ku Klux Klan"); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 234 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) "to stamp out wide-
spread violations of constitutional rights at virtually any cost"); Gressman, The Unhappy History of
Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1334 (1952) (creation of private remedies intended
to protect against Klan-inspired lynchings and mob violence).
186. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), in which the Court upheld implication of a
private remedy for alleged misuse of proxies in violation of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982). The Court reasoned that "[plrivate enforcement of the proxy rules
provides a necessary supplement to [Securities and Exchange] Commission action . . . . [T]he possi-
bility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the
proxy requirements." 377 U.S. at 432. Since Borak, of course, the Court has cut back on the implica-
tion of private remedies. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). The point here
is that the principal objective for implying remedies, when that is allowed, is to further a congres-
sional regulatory goal, not to provide private compensation.
187. Plaintiffs could argue that the congressional policy would always be furthered by rules favor-
ing plaintiffs, but in reality regulation through private litigation is a two-edged sword. Indeed, the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is sufficiently concerned about overbroad interpreta-
tion of the antitrust laws in private litigation that it has participated in certain private cases to oppose
positions taken by plaintiffs. William Baxter, Assistant Attorney General and head of the Antitrust
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The outer boundaries of the principle of competence are illustrated by
the recurrent problems in applying statutes of limitations to transferred
federal claims. Many federal claims, particularly those implied by the
courts, lack congressionally set limitations periods. Arguably the federal
courts could themselves fashion limitations periods, but they have stead-
fastly declined to do so on the ground that such an effort would involve
inappropriate judicial legislation.1"" Put differently, the problem is beyond
the competence of federal courts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court early
directed that a federal court should apply the limitations period employed
by the state in which it sits for the most closely analogous state law
claim."8 9 This approach, of course, has caused great disparities in limita-
tions periods applied to certain federal claims' 90 and has raised interesting
choice-of-law questions after transfer of such claims. In H.L. Green Co. v.
MacMahon,'9' the Second Circuit decided that a transfer should not alter
the limitations period that plaintiff had acquired by the exercise of his
venue privilege, a conclusion implicitly adopted by the Supreme Court in
its reliance on Green in Van Dusen.'92 This conclusion is not inconsistent
with the principle that federal courts are competent to decide issues of
federal law, since federal courts are not competent to create limitations
periods where Congress has failed to specify them. By default, the matter
therefore turns on plaintiff's choice of forum. Many of the cases holding
Division of the Department of Justice, has announced that the Division will, in appropriate cases,
support arguments made by defendants in antitrust cases. Generally this effort is by amicus brief. See
Department of Justice Authorization for Fiscal Year 1984, Subcomm. on Monopolies & Commercial
Law of the Comm. of theJudiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-20 (1983). For a case in which the
Division has so acted, see Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1249 (1983), in which the Division is urging that resale price maintenance
should not be treated as a per se violation of antitrust law, but judged instead under the rule of
reason. See Antitrust Revolution Slows, Nat'l L.J., July 25, 1983, at 1, col. 1. For a list of the cases in
which the Division has submitted amicus briefs, see 44 A irRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
1106, at 612-14 (March 17, 1983).
188. Thus, in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), the Court was asked to
establish a uniform limitations period for claims under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, currently codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), which did not specify a period of limitations. The
Court characterized the request as seeking a "drastic sort of judicial legislation," 383 U.S. at 703, and
refused to indulge in "so bald a form of judicial innovation." Id. at 701.
189. The first such case was M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830). For discussions of
the borrowing practice, see Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal
Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1043-46 (1980); Note,
Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 68 (1953).
Arguably the federal courts should develop some choice-of-law principles to determine which state's
limitations period should apply. Thus, where the claim arose in State X, it might be appropriate to
apply its limitations period'although the suit was filed in federal court in State Y. The argument made
in the text does not address this question, but focuses only on the question whether a transfer should
change the limitations period.
190. For example, in actions under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1982), limitations periods have varied from one to ten years. Ruder & Cross, Limitations on
Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125, 1144.
191. 312 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).
192. See 376 U.S. at 632-33.
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that the law of the transferor forum applies are hence correct because
these cases actually only consider the statute of limitations question. 93 At
least one court has explicitly recognized that determination of the limita-
tions period is different from other issues, which the transferee court is of
course competent to decide. 94 But there remains the problem of selecting
the "analogous" state limitations period. On this federal question, some
transferee courts make their own analysis, 9 ' while others follow the anal-
ysis of the transferor circuit. 98 Given the principle of competence, the
transferee court should decide for itself.
B. Interpretation of the Transfer Statutes
Ultimately Van Dusen is a statutory construction case; the first sentence
of the opinion announces that "[t]his case involves the construction and
application of § 1404(a) .... ,,197 Given the assumption that applying
Van Dusen to transfers of federal claims violates the principle of compe-
tence, there remains the question whether the transfer statutes require
that result.
This question is difficult to answer with absolute certainty. Since the
principle of competence is a starting point, a substantial showing should
be required to justify overriding it, and there appears to be no reason to
do so. The legislative history of the transfer statutes provides little guid-
ance. One could argue that permitting a change of law might frustrate the
purposes of the transfer statutes by deterring courts from transferring, but
the risk that courts would decline to transfer on this ground seems slight.
More significant, therefore, are the numerous difficulties that would be
caused by requiring the application of the transferor circuit's interpreta-
193. E.g., Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1975); Sargent
v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 1974); Railing v. UMW, 429 F.2d 780, 781 (4th Cir.
1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 486 (1971); Thorn v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 523 F. Supp.
1193, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 726 (W.D. Mich. 1980),
aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982); In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,015 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 1977); Corey v. Bache & Co., 355 F. Supp.
1123, 1125 (S.D.W. Va. 1973).
As a consequence, Van Dusen will have some enduring effect on transferred federal claims until a
federal principle for selection of a limitations period is developed. See supra note 189. But it is worth
noting that Van Dusen should be inapplicable to federal issues in diversity cases, which the federal
courts are competent to decide. For example, in a libel action the transferee court is competent to
decide any First Amendment defense without deferring to the interpretation of the transferor federal
court or the courts of the state in which the transferor court sits. Thus, the basic principle of compe-
tence endures.
194. Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 98,267, at 91,712 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1981).
195. Corey v. Bache & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1123, 1125-26 (S.D.W. Va. 1973).
196. E.g., Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1975); In re
Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,015 (D.
Kan. Mar. 18, 1977).
197. 376 U.S. at 613.
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tion. Accordingly, the statutes should not be interpreted as rejecting the
principle of competence.
1. Legislative History
The legislative history of section 1404(a) says little about choice of law.
Indeed, the drafters may never have considered which forum's law should
apply to transferred cases.198 In Van Dusen, the Supreme Court found the
legislative history inconclusive and therefore relied on the assumption that
Congress did not intend to alter the principle of venue privilege in diver-
sity cases. When section 1404(a) was enacted, the principle of competence
was also well established, however, and there is similarly no basis in the
legislative history for concluding that Congress meant to depart from it.
The legislative history of the multidistrict litigation statute does provide
an argument for applying transferor law to transferred federal claims, but
the argument carries little weight. In hearings before the Senate subcom-
mittee responsible for the bill that eventually became law, two witnesses
who had been involved in the handling of the electrical equipment price
fixing cases,199 Dean Phil Neal and Judge William Becker, both stated
that Van Dusen would apply to choice-of-law issues under the new stat-
ute.200 Since their experience related to federal claims for violation of the
antitrust laws, these comments may provide a basis for retaining trans-
feror interpretation after multidistrict transfer of federal claims. But Van
198. It has been reported that Professor Moore, who proposed § 1404(a), stated in 1964 that the
drafters never considered the choice-of-law problems it would create. Note, Choice of Law After
Transfer of Venue, 75 YALE L.J. 90, 94 & n.24 (1965). Before the statute was enacted, however,
Professor Braucher raised the choice-of-law problem in a law review article. Braucher, The Inconven-
ient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REV. 908, 936 (1947).
199. The many federal suits filed in the wake of the price fixing convictions in the electrical
equipment industry, approximately 25,000 claims in nearly 2,000 suits, were administered by a Coor-
dinating Committee for Multiple Litigation in the United States District Courts, which was estab-
lished by Chief Justice Warren for that purpose. Dean Neal was Executive Secretary of the Commit-
tee, and Judge Becker was a member of it.
200. Dean Neal testified as follows in response to a question from Senator Tydings, sponsor of
the legislation:
SENATOR TYDINGS. Dean Neal, there would be a variety of questions of law involving
substantive as well as procedural rights that would have to be decided by the transferee judge,
such as capacity to sue, limitations and other bars to action, privileged communications, scope
of discovery, and so forth. Are questions of choice of law sufficiently settled so that we do not
have to spell it out in the legislation here, or do we need statutory guidelines?
DEAN NEAL. I think the answer has been indicated quite clearly by the Supreme Court in
the Van Dusen case ofr a year or two ago, in which the court held that in cases transferred
under section 1404(a) the applicable law would be the law that would have been applied had
the case remained in the transferor district. I see no reason to suppose that that rule would not
govern under section 1407 as well.
Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings on S. 3815 Before the Subcomm. on Inprovements in Judidal
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1966) (statement of Dean
Neal) [hereinafter cited as Hearings: Multidistrict Litigation Bill]. Judge Becker testified that he
agreed with Dean Neal. Id. at 25 (statement of Judge Becker).
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Dusen itself was carefully limited to questions of state law,2"' and the
testimony of Dean Neal and Judge Becker seems to mean only that Van
Dusen would apply to state law issues in cases transferred under the new
statute. Since many diversity cases would be subject to transfer under the
multidistrict statute, the testimony can best be interpreted as applying to
such situations.
The contemplated functioning of the multidistrict transfer provision
might support an argument that Congress intended transfers to effect no
change in substantive law. Unlike section 1404(a), the new statute author-
ized transfer only for pretrial purposes. This limitation arguably shows
that Congress wanted to guard against changes in applicable interpreta-
tion. Some commentators have in fact contended that the courts subse-
quently expanded the powers of the transferee courts to decide the merits
of transferred cases beyond Congress' original intention.2"2 But, in fact,
transferee courts have usually decided transferred cases,20 3 so the supposed
restriction of their power to pretrial matters is hardly a basis for preserv-
ing transferor interpretation of federal law. As with section 1404(a), there
is no helpful guidance in the legislative history of the multidistrict statute.
2. The Risk of Deterring Transfers
In Van Dusen, the Court reasoned that applying the law of the trans-
feree state in diversity cases would frustrate the remedial purposes of sec-
tion 1404(a) because courts would then be reluctant to grant transfers for
fear of prejudicing plaintiffs' cases.2"" Obviously the prospect did not deter
the district judge in Van Dusen,2" 5 but the risk that others would be de-
terred might still justify interpreting the transfer statutes to preserve
plaintiff's original choice of law.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate the risk that courts would ulti-
mately be deterred from transferring by application of the transferee's law
to transferred federal claims. One decision by the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation suggests that it might be. In In re Plumbing Fixtures
Litigation,208 a plaintiff in a tag-along case resisted transfer on the ground
that, as an indirect purchaser, it would be prejudiced by a transfer to the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which had held that indirect purchasers
201. See 376 U.S. at 625-26, 630, 633, 635, 639.
202. See Note, Experience of Transferee Courts, supra note 29, at 595-96, 602-03.
203. See supra p. 681.
204. See 376 U.S. at 629-30.
205. The district judge's citation of Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir.
1950), suggests that he may have believed transferor law would apply. See Popkin v. Eastern Air
Lines, 204 F. Supp. 426, 433 (E.D. Pa.), vacated sub noia. Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d
Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
206. 342 F. Supp. 756 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972).
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lacked standing to sue for price fixing. The Supreme Court had not yet
resolved this issue. Without citing the legislative history, the Panel re-
jected plaintiff's argument on the ground that it was "clear" that Van
Dusen required application of transferor law.207 There is thus at least an
implication that the Panel would otherwise have had second thoughts
about transferring the case. Certainly the Third Circuit's holding in Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno-that dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is
never allowed where it will result in an adverse change of
law2°0 -suggests that there is a similar risk with motions under section
1404(a).
The risk nevertheless does not appear great. In large part, the Third
Circuit's holding in Reyno was based on its interpretation of Van Du-
sen.209 The Supreme Court's reversal in Reyno made it clear that such
solicitude for plaintiffs' forum shopping was unwarranted. Moreover,
plaintiffs' desire to capture a favorable interpretation of federal law or
courts' solicitude for that desire hardly seems to counterbalance the princi-
ple of competence. In fact, the pre-Van Dusen cases concluded that a po-
tential change in interpretation of federal law was irrelevant to a transfer
motion because a plaintiff has no right to select among interpretations.' °
Finally, the Multidistrict Panel's inclination to stress matters of judicial
economy suggests that it will not expend judicial resources merely to pre-
serve the plaintiff's desired interpretation of federal law.2 ' Accordingly,
while the risk of deterring transfers appears substantial in the abstract, in
reality it seems to be of little importance in determining whether the
transfer statutes override the principle of competence. 2
207. Id. at 758.
208. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). As
indicated supra note 137, it may be that the Supreme Court overstated the Third Circuit's adherence
to this doctrine.
209. See 630 F.2d at 163-64 (relying on DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978)). In DeMateos, the Third Circuit found Van Dusen to compel its
holding. 562 F.2d at 899.
210. See supra p. 706. In Ackert v. Bryan, 299 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1962), for example, the court
transferred despite plaintiff's argument that the transfer would be tantamount to a dismissal. See
supra p. 706.
211. In In re Texas Gulf Sulphur Sec. Litig., 344 F. Supp. 1398 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972), the Panel
evinced little sympathy for such concerns: "[Tlhe prospect of an unfavorable ruling by the transferee
court or the possibility that another district judge may be more favorably disposed to a litigant's
contentions are clearly not factors considered by the Panel in determining whether transfer for coordi-
nated or consolidated pretrial proceedings is appropriate." Id. at 1400 (citations omitted).
212. But see 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 14, § 3854, at 298 (arguing that
transfer would not be "in the interests of justice" if it resulted in adverse change in interpretation of
federal law).
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3. Difficulties Caused by Applying Transferor Interpretation
Applying Van Dusen to federal claims can cause three types of difficul-
ties: problems in ascertaining foreign law, uncertainties about the breadth
of the required borrowing from the transferor forum, and complications in
consolidated cases. These difficulties could significantly increase the bur-
dens upon federal courts. The transfer statutes were enacted to reduce
such burdens by making more efficient use of the unitary federal system,
and they should be interpreted accordingly.
a. Difficulty in Ascertaining Foreign Interpretation
Erie requires federal courts, upon deciding that state law governs a
given issue, to determine what the controlling state law is. Often this task
requires federal courts to resolve extremely difficult issues without precise
guidance from the state cases. "13 The law of forum non conveniens was
intended in part to extricate federal courts from such predicaments. Thus,
when the Supreme Court upheld the common law power of a federal
court to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, it noted that such dis-
missal was permissible in part to save the court the trouble of having to
"untangle problems . . . in law foreign to itself."21 Similarly, Piper Air-
craft Co. v. Reyno confirmed that dismissal was appropriate to avoid
"'complex exercises in comparative law."2 15 Applying Van Dusen to trans-
fers of federal claims, however, would create equally severe problems of
interpretation.
To put the matter in perspective, consider the difficulty that district
courts often encounter in deciding what their own courts of appeals would
hold on important issues. Particularly where the circuit is large, various
panels may take different approaches to the same issue of federal law,
leaving the district courts in a muddle pending an en banc resolution.
This problem is serious enough to cause some to favor splitting up the
larger circuits. Since issues on which the circuits conflict are often inher-
ently difficult, any determination by a lower court on such issues prior to
an en banc resolution is a challenging task.
This difficulty would be compounded were the transferee judge re-
quired to divine the attitude of another circuit on such questions. The
absence of a recognized conflict would not mean that he could assume that
the transferor circuit would decide a given issue in the same way as his
213. For a review of the "rules" that guide a federal court in this effort, see C. WRIGHT, supra
note 166, § 58. For an example of the difficulties that this analysis can impose on a federal court, see
McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
214. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
215. 454 U.S. at 251. This concern is more common with non-American law, but it may apply as
well to domestic issues.
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own circuit."1 6 The transferee judge would need to examine the law of the
transferor circuit in every case, and to guess what another circuit would
say about the issue presented. Unlike a district judge in that circuit, the
transferee judge could not even hope that an appeal would give him spe-
cific guidance. Instead, since appeal would be to the transferee circuit, the
appellate court would face the same task as the transferee district judge.
The added burden of ascertaining foreign interpretations is not imagi-
nary.21" In this era of hyperlexis,2" 8 federal district courts have enough
difficulty rendering decisions on federal issues that are consistent with the
views of the courts that review those decisions; it would be unnecessarily
burdensome to require them to decide how other circuits would resolve
those issues. The principle of competence does not assume that transferee
judges can accomplish this task; neither should the transfer statutes.
b. Substance v. Procedure-How Broad the Reference?
Even if required to apply the interpretation of the transferor circuit, the
transferee court could still apply its own rules with respect to some mat-
ters. Van Dusen confirmed that after transfer of diversity cases the plain-
tiff retains only that transferor law which would "significantly affect the
outcome of the case."21 9 The transferee court is free to apply its own
"rules governing the conduct and dispatch of cases."'22 On its face, this
statement appears to adopt a rule resembling one test used under Erie to
216. Indeed, the potential for conflicting decisions, even if unrealized, prevents federal court deci-
sions from having binding national effect, and therefore is a factor which many argue supports reform
of the federal appellate system. E.g., Hruska Commission, supra note 1, at 219; Meador, A Comment
on the Chief Justice's Proposals, 69 A.B.A. J. 448, 449 (1983). To the degree one seeks to preserve
the attitude of the transferor circuit, see supra p. 691, the task becomes almost metaphysical.
217. See In re Haven Indus., 462 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The issue there was whether in
pari delicto should operate as a defense to an action by a "tippee" against a "tipper" where a viola-
tion of § 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act occurred. Since the case was transferred from the
District of Massachusetts, the judge in New York concluded that he had to apply the law of the First
Circuit. Although two other circuits and Judge Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York had
decided the issue, neither the First Circuit nor the District of Massachusetts had done so. Faced with
conflicting interpretations, the transferee judge noted, "this court's difficult task is to determine what
these courts would rule were they to confront the issue." Id. at 179. The court then attempted to do
so. The legal analysis was difficult enough without introducing the need for telepathy.
218. See Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 767 (1977) (describing
"the pathological condition caused by an overactive law-making gland" in America as "a heartworm
that has a literally fatal potential for the body politic of this country").
219. 376 U.S. at 639 n.40.
220. Id. In Decker v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 681 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1982), the court applied this distinction to a transferred
federal claim. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's complaint for securities fraud
failed to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), which requires particularity in pleading fraud. Plaintiff argued
that the Third Circuit interpretation of Rule 9(b) should be followed because the case was originally
filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and transferred to New York. The court rejected plain-
tiff's argument as "specious," reasoning that "rules governing pleadings, like the one involved here
clearly are procedural and not substantive." Id. at 240 n.2.
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determine which matters in diversity cases must be decided by state
law-the "outcome-determinative" analysis of Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York.221 In transferred diversity cases, the Guaranty Trust standard,
though difficult to apply, is logical because it permits the transferee court
to apply its own interpretation to the issues governed by federal law.222
The same approach is of doubtful utility in cases where federal claims
are transferred. Drawing the line between matters of substance and proce-
dure could become difficult. Arguably, an outcome-determinative analysis
would require application of the transferee court's interpretation of some
or all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Hanna v.
Plumer held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied
to diversity cases so long as they are "arguably procedural, 223 that deci-
sion was grounded primarily on the Rules Enabling Act,224 which pro-
vides authority for creation of the federal rules but gives no guidelines for
distinguishing between varying interpretations of them. Yet differing ap-
proaches to matters such as the requisites for certification of a class under
Rule 23225 could have a significant effect on litigation, a reality reflected
in the now-discredited "death knell" justification for immediate appeal-
ability of denials of class certification.226
221. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
222. Of course, if one took an extreme acquired rights approach one would want to preserve
transferor interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To this extent, then, Van Dusen
itself does not adhere to a strict acquired rights approach.
223. This is the way Justice Harlan described the rule of the majority opinion in Hanna. Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
225. Differences among the circuits on Rule 23 are certainly possible. For example, with regard
to pre-certification decision of the merits, compare Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d
Cir.) (en banc) (decision on liability before class certification permitted), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974) with Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1975) (certification of class after
liability decision not permitted). With regard to the need to give pre-judgment notice in actions certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(2), compare Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (need not give notice), aff'd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977) with Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598
F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1979) (must give notice). For a recent Supreme Court decision resolving a
conflict between the circuits on interpretation of Rule 23, see Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 103
S. Ct. 2392 (1983).
Rule 23 is not the only rule that has received differing interpretations. For example, the availability
of protective orders under Rule 26(c) has recently been the subject of much disagreement. See Marcus,
Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1983); see also Decker v.
Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 239, 240 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 681 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1982) (transferee circuit's interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) should be
applied).
226. The "death knell" doctrine treated a denial of class certification as immediately appealable
on the ground that such litigation will not be pursued without class certification because the individ-
ual stake of each class member is too small. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463
(1978), the Court rejected this view of appellate jurisdiction, but it did not question the assumption
that denial of certification would in fact sound the death knell of some class actions. See id. at 470.
The point here is only that the certification decision can have a significant impact on the outcome of a
case.
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Nor is the problem limited to matters governed by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; differences of approach to other "procedural" issues
could be extremely important. For example, consider the showing neces-
sary to justify entry of an injunction. In a diversity case, federal law
would govern this issue because the availability of equitable remedies in
federal court for the violation of rights created by state law is properly a
matter of federal law.2 7 But how does one resolve the problem if the
transferee and transferor circuits themselves employ different standards
for the issuance of an injunction? Moving even closer to substance, con-
sider the popular doctrine of fraudulent concealment, used to toll the run-
ning of the statute of limitations where defendant has concealed his
wrongdoing. In a diversity case, the availability of this doctrine is a matter
governed by the applicable state law.228 There are substantial disparities
between different circuits, however, about how the doctrine should be ap-
plied to federal claims.229 Should the transferor's approach be employed
because it would be substantive for Erie purposes?
At present there is nothing to help the lower courts resolve these ques-
tions. The problems that they have encountered in answering analogous
questions in diversity cases confirm the wisdom of interpreting the trans-
fer statutes to avoid such confusion in federal claim cases by applying
transferee law.
c. Complications in Consolidated Cases.
Consolidation of related cases is an important objective of both transfer
statutes. The stated goal of multidistrict transfer is to allow coordinated or
consolidated pretrial preparation.2 0 Similarly, under section 1404(a) the
prospect of consolidation with litigation pending in the transferee court
argues powerfully in favor of transfer.2 1 This preference for combined
treatment seeks to make the litigation more efficient and less burdensome
227. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 106 (1945); 11 C. WRIGr & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 2942-2943 (1973).
228. This conclusion follows from Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) and Holm-
berg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). In the former, the Court held that the statute of limitations
in a diversity case is governed by state law. In the latter, it held that where the claim is federally
created, rules for tolling limitations due to concealment are federally determined. Clearly the tolling
issues, like other limitations issues, are matters of state law in diversity cases. See Tracerlab, Inc. v.
Industrial Nucleonics Corp., 313 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1963) (applying state tolling law to diversity
claim).
229. 1 have discussed these differences between circuits at length in Marcus, Fraudulent Conceal-
ment in Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard?, 71 GEO. L.J. 829 (1983). For an
example of a court grappling with conflicting rules of fraudulent concealment in a transferred case,
see Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
98,267, at 91,712 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1981).
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).
231. See cases cited in 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 14, § 3854, at 281 n.5.
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for both the parties and the court. Requiring application of transferor law
could frustrate these objectives.
Applying divergent legal standards may undermine consolidation. Con-
solidated cases can be handled effectively only if the same legal rules ap-
ply to them.2"2 Even such seemingly straightforward matters as the scope
of discovery may depend upon the application of the legal rules that later
will be used to decide the lawsuit. It was for precisely this reason that the
proponents of the multidistrict transfer statute insisted that the transferee
court have the power to resolve such issues going to the merits as part of
its power to control discovery.2"' Consolidation-and hence trans-
fer-would be frustrated if such issues were resolved differently in differ-
ent cases. Indeed, in Van Dusen itself the district court on remand decided
against transfer because of the difference between the legal rules that
would apply to the cases from Pennsylvania and those that would apply to
the cases originally filed in Massachusetts.2 ' While such difficulties are
justified in diversity cases by the principles on which Van Dusen is based,
the same principles do not apply to transferred federal claim cases. Unless
both transfer statutes are interpreted to apply the law of the transferee
court, such disarray may eventually characterize all transferred cases.
The lower courts have not yet directly confronted the problem of inter-
preting the transfer statutes,235 but an indirect process leading to applica-
tion of transferor law has occurred under the doctrine of the law of the
case. Appropriately enough, it can be illustrated by the Plumbing Fixtures
antitrust cases.238 In Plumbing Fixtures, the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation casually asserted that Van Dusen would apply to a trans-
ferred antitrust claim, thereby overcoming the objections of an indirect
purchaser plaintiff that feared transfer to the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, which had already held that such plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue.237 In Philadelphia, however, Judge Alexander Harvey was compelled
by circumstance to take a different tack despite prior assurances of fealty
232. For a description of the difficulties caused by differing legal standards in diversity aircraft
crash litigation, see Note, The Case For a Federal Common Law of Aircraft Disaster Litigation: A
Judicial Solution to a National Problem, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 231, 236-37, 257-60 (1976) (advocating
creation of uniform federal law of air crashes).
233. Thus, Judge William Becker, testifying in support of the proposed multidistrict transfer
statute, argued strongly in favor of giving transferee courts the power to decide legal issues. He as-
serted that "[it is impossible to separate discovery on factual issues from the power to make legal
rulings" because the scope of discovery will often turn on such rulings. Hearings: Multidistrict Litiga-
tion Bill, supra note 200, at 21.
234. Popkin v. Eastern Air Lines, 253 F. Supp. 244, 249 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
235. But see In re Wickes Cos. Sec. Litig., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 99,085, at 95,179 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1983) (standards of secondary liability might be
different for consolidated cases because they were transferred from various circuits).
236. In re Plumbing Fixtures Litig., 342 F. Supp. 756, 758 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972) (per curiam).
237. Id. at 758; see supra p. 712.
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to Van Dusen.38 Earlier in the consolidated proceedings, Judge Lord had
granted defense motions to dismiss indirect purchaser plaintiffs in certain
cases,23 9 presumably stimulating the unsuccessful effort to persuade the
Panel not to transfer. Thereafter, similar defense motions were made in
other cases, and the issue was argued by counsel on behalf of plaintiffs
from the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits who contended that indirect
purchasers should have standing to sue.2 40 Rather than reconsider the sta-
tus of indirect purchasers, Judge Harvey let the earlier ruling stand as the
law of the case, a principle he found "particularly applicable to multidis-
trict litigation in which the presence of a large number of diverse parties
might otherwise result in constant relitigation of the same legal issues."24
It is not difficult to understand the practical necessity for Judge Harvey's
ruling. There were 389 plumbing fixture cases pending before him2 42 and
undoubtedly he had enough problems resolving such issues once without
confronting constant relitigation. While Judge Harvey's approach may
raise legitimate considerations of due process, 243 it hardly seems appropri-
ate to interpret the transfer statutes as imposing on him the burden of
relitigation.
Analogous administrative difficulties could frustrate the use of class ac-
tions. In both antitrust and securities litigation, plaintiffs have frequently
used national or regional class actions, thereby relieving courts of duplica-
238. Judge Lord, Judge Harvey's predecessor in the case, had earlier supported a literal applica-
tion of Van Dusen. In Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
309 F. Supp. 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1969), he was presented with a venue challenge by a defendant in a case
transferred from the District of Columbia pursuant to the multidistrict transfer statute. In deciding
the motion, which required interpretation of the special venue provision of the Clayton Act, he held
that Van Dusen required application of the District of Columbia interpretation of that venue statute
and affirmed that "[t]he Court is mindful that District of Columbia law, and not Eastern District of
Pennsylvania law, is to apply here." Id. at 1055.
239. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13
(E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nor. Mangana v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438
F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court ultimately held, of course, that the district court was
correct in holding that there was no standing to sue. See supra p. 688. Thus, compelling Judge
Harvey to decide differently would have led to an incorrect result.
240. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp.
381 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
241. Id. at 383. For other applications of the law of the case doctrine in transfer situations, see In
re Exterior Siding & Aluminum Coil Antitrust Litig., 696 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 204 (1983); Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Upjohn
Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981).
242. Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 75 F.R.D. 577, 579 (1977).
243. Under Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), a nonparty may not be bound by a judgment
against his "representative" unless adequate precautions are taken to protect his interests. In a sense,
in a consolidated action like Plumbing Fixtures, binding the later plaintiffs or defendants to the re-
sults obtained by their fellows in earlier pretrial rulings involves appointing the litigants to the first
decision as representatives of the others. For these reasons, in part, the Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion has an elaborate system for appointment of lead and liaison counsel to act on behalf of all. See
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LIGATION §§ 1.90-.92 (5th ed. 1982). Without some such protection of
the rights of absent parties, there may be serious due process problems.
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tive individual actions and affording relief to large numbers of people.
Often such litigations begin with class action complaints filed in a number
of locations, which leads almost inevitably to an effort to transfer them all
to one district. Indeed, the Panel has explicitly recognized the pendency of
overlapping putative class actions as a factor strongly favoring transfer.""
After transfer, additional problems arise. The transferee judge must de-
cide whether to certify a class. That task is inherently difficult, but it
becomes more so if the court must also consider the interpretations of the
antitrust or securities law of the various transferor courts. Should the clas-
ses, if certified, be segmented by circuit? Does the law governing the
rights of the class depend upon where the action was originally filed, with
all the class members, wherever they reside, riding the choice-of-law coat-
tails of the named representative?24 5 Among contending potential class
representatives, is the choice-of-law issue relevant in selecting the class
representative, giving the candidate who captured a favorable interpreta-
tion an edge? In diversity cases, the differences between legal standards
can preclude the certification of a class consisting of residents of more
than one state.246 It would be unfortunate to undermine Rule 23 in cases
involving federal claims as well.
CONCLUSION
There has been no rush to determine whether Van Dusen should apply
to transferred federal claims despite the large number of transfers. The
244. In re Piper Aircraft Distrib. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 405 F. Supp. 1402, 1403-04 (J.P.M.D.L.
1975). As of 1974, it was reported that the Panel had transferred all cases involving potentially
overlapping classes. Note, supra note 18, at 1010 & n.41 (1974); see also Levy, supra note 20, at
51-52, 61-62 (1971).
245. It has been held that, in ruling on a motion of transfer under § 1404(a), the plaintiff's choice
of forum is less important where the plaintiff represents a class than where he sues individually. See
Blumenthal v. Management Assistance, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 470, 472 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Impervious
Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 444 F. Supp. 465, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Contra Carty v. Health-Chem
Corp., 36 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 122, 123-24 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Similarly, the Supreme Court has asserted
that the plaintiff's forum selection in a derivative action is entitled to less weight: "[W]here there are
hundreds of potential plaintiffs, all equally entitled voluntarily to invest themselves with the corpora-
tion's cause of action and all of whom could with equal show of right go into their many home courts,
the claim of any one plaintiff that a forum is appropriate merely because it is his home forum is
considerably weakened." Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947) (foot-
note omitted).
246. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 850
(9th Cir. 1982) (overturning certification of nationwide class for punitive damages issues in part be-
cause of differences between state standards for awarding punitive damages), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
817 (1983).
Much the same problem can arise in connection with the limitations period for a class that includes
residents of several states asserting a federal claim in which there is no federal limitations period. The
problem of "borrowing" a limitations period becomes difficult and may turn on the residence of class
members, not the residence of the class representative. For an example of the difficulties this problem
presents, see In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SE. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,015, at 91,566-72 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 1977).
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prospect of congressional action to revise the federal appellate structure
may tempt the lower courts to continue to ignore this problem and simply
to parrot Van Dusen without carefully considering its application.
Whether or not Congress acts, however, problems from differing interpre-
tations of federal law in transferred cases will not magically disappear. If
Congress ever devises a solution to the problem of conflicts among the
circuits, that development will provide yet another reason not to ask the
transferee court to fathom and apply transferor law, since such a solution
should rejuvenate a "national law" that is uniformly interpreted and
make concerns about inconsistent decisions passE. Until that magic mo-
ment, however, the volume of transfers makes it important to decide the
impact of differing interpretations on transferred cases.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is unlikely to provide guidance. Al-
though individual Justices may assert that the Court is unable to resolve
all significant conflicts,2 47 the Court cannot be expected to premise a deci-
sion on that inability. Moreover, in any case where the issue of choice
between transferor and transferee interpretation might be presented, the
Court would presumably decide the case on the merits rather than by
promulgating rules regarding choice of interpretation.24 Like the possibil-
ity of congressional action, the prospect of Supreme Court guidance is not
a reason for delay. The lower courts must therefore decide for themselves.
They are of course quite willing to decide most issues for themselves,
thereby creating conflicts among the circuits, but they have not come to
grips with the problems that these conflicts raise in transferred cases.
This Article has attempted to unravel the issues that should bear on the
handling of these conflicts in transferred federal claims cases. As it has
shown, Van Dusen correctly controls transfers of diversity cases because
permitting a change of law would jeopardize Erie concerns.249 But Erie is
entirely irrelevant to transfers of federal claims. Acquired rights, the other
ground for Van Dusen, provides no basis for deciding whether to apply
the transferor's interpretation of federal issues. Accordingly, the reasoning
of Van Dusen is inapplicable. In its place, this Article has proposed reli-
ance on the principle that the transferee court is fully competent to decide
issues of federal law. Requiring application of transferor interpretation
would, by definition, offend this principle because it would only affect the
247. See supra note 1.
248. Thus, in Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), discussed supra pp. 703-04, the Court,
much to Justice Frankfurter's chagrin, gave no weight to the fact that the Seventh Circuit refused to
accept the Fifth Circuit's earlier ruling in the same case as the law of the case. See supra note 163.
Surely it would be less likely to address the consequences of a transfer on interpretation of federal law
where the transferor circuit had not decided the actual case transferred.
249. See supra p. 695.
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outcome when the transferee court would reach a different result if free to
decide the issues on the merits.
The ultimate question this Article addresses, therefore, is whether the
transfer statutes justify thus offending the principle of competence. Legis-
lative history provides little useful insight. One possible justification, a
desire not to deter other transfers, is not persuasive. In general, the risk
seems small. Under the multidistrict litigation statute, moreover, the
Panel's emphasis on judicial efficiency greatly reduces the importance of
possible prejudice to plaintiffs. Finally, there seems to be little reason to
prefer the transferor interpretation simply to protect plaintiffs who forum
shop for favorable interpretations; already some courts have transferred
federal claims despite protests that the claim is viable only in the trans-
feror circuit.
2 50
The transfer provisions would, however, be impaired substantially by
insisting upon adherence to transferor interpretation. Transferee judges
would be burdened with the difficult task of divining the attitude of the
transferor circuit; such adherence would present new problems in distin-
guishing between "substantive" matters, which are governed by transferor
interpretation, and "procedural" matters, which are not; and consolidated
treatment of transferred cases would become more difficult or perhaps im-
possible. In this day of escalating caseloads it is foolish to weaken the
transfer devices, which attempt to utilize the unified federal judicial sys-
tem to relieve part of the burden on the courts. The courts should there-
fore recognize that the transferee court must be free to decide a federal
claim in the manner it views as correct without deferring to the interpre-
tation of the transferor circuit.
250. See supra p. 706 (discussing Ackert v. Bryan, 299 F.2d 65 (2d. Cir. 1962)).
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